

**Yo  
Voté**



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Voté**



Evaluation Study | **June 2016**





## **One Arizona Evaluation Study**

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**June 2016**

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**In 2010,** Arizona was ground zero for anti-immigrant sentiment and legislation, drawing national and even international headlines for SB 1070, the “show me your papers” law. Activists responded to form the nonpartisan One Arizona, aimed at promoting full electoral participation of Latino citizens, especially infrequent and first-time voters. Three years later, the coalition expanded to target young citizens and unmarried women while continuing to focus on voter registration, voter mobilization, and election protection.

How successful have One Arizona’s efforts been to date, and where should it look in the future? This evaluation study aims to answer that question by drawing on 28 structured one-on-one key stakeholder interviews and a statistical analysis of five years of voter engagement and turnout results. It’s also important to look back at the deep roots of the current climate for Latinos in Arizona, stretching back to the politically charged history of Mexican-American civic and political incorporation into the United States, and the disenfranchisement and racism that followed in the Southwest.

In the wake of SB 1070, ten community organizations—Arizona Advocacy Network (AZAN), Arizona Center for Empowerment (ACE), Border Action Network (BAN), Central Arizonans for a Sustainable Economy (CASE), Democracia USA (DUSA), Mi Familia Vota (MFV), Promise Arizona (PAZ), Protecting Arizona’s Family Coalition (PAFCO), Puente Arizona (Puente), and Southwest Conference of United Church of Christ (UCC)—came

together to form One Arizona, agreeing on a collaborative pact to ensure accountability and leverage the best from each community partner to increase civic engagement, power, and safety for the state’s vulnerable Latino and immigrant communities. The new coalition, with initial seed funding from Four Freedoms Fund and later Unbound Philanthropy, was able to help the groups move beyond an unhealthy and competitive relationship to create a collaborative united movement focused on increasing Latino voter engagement, turnout, and power.

## **Seven core ingredients have allowed the One Arizona table to endure and remain effective:**

- 1.** Implementing nonpartisan year-round voter engagement strategies;
- 2.** Staying focused on expanding the Latino electorate and increasing Latino power;
- 3.** Serving as a neutral space where different roles and strategies are respected;
- 4.** Establishing clear accountability mechanisms that bring order and structure;
- 5.** Having funder partnerships that add value beyond grant dollars, including brokering timely, high-quality, and strategic capacity-building support;
- 6.** Using data to inform and adjust field strategies; and
- 7.** Staying on course to build long-term sustainable political power.

**“For me, One Arizona moved people from fear to hope, from desperation to intentionality, from despair to courage.”**

**-One Arizona founding partner**

Most importantly, One Arizona’s efforts are changing the way Latino and other citizens view democracy and take part in it. Its work has helped encourage, train, and develop a broad number of young activists, creating a new, committed generation of leadership. In only a few years, the coalition has grown a vibrant, organic garden of capable leaders, giving them voice, methodology, and a tangible community.

Results prove effectiveness: A detailed year-by-year analysis of voter data reveals that, as hoped, One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts—more than three million attempted voter engagements or contacts between 2010 and 2015—have consistently increased turnout, particularly among low-propensity Latino voters. Latino voters are overrepresented among demographic groups with lower voter turnout—those who are young, poorer, and with less formal education.

By moving away from robocalls and toward door-to-door canvassing, the table has seen marked increases in both even-year federal elections (e.g., the 2010 midterm general election) and odd-year municipal elections (e.g., the 2011 municipal elections in Phoenix). In addition to its impact on voter turnout, the coalition has changed the way that citizens vote by increasing the number of low-propensity Latino and New American Majority voters who are on the Permanent Early Voter List (PEVL). This increase of PEVL for Latinos that have not voted on a regular basis is critical by making voting more convenient and accessible.

Out of all outreach attempts during 2010–15, One Arizona activists made more than a million

successful voter contacts, a contact rate of 35 percent, as well as engaging or successfully contacting some 117,000 unique voters—three-quarters of them Latino—regarding vote-by-mail and/or early voting (asking eligible Latino voters to sign up for PEVL, or encouraging those already signed up for PEVL to actually vote). Overall, One Arizona has used vote-by-mail to address obstacles to voting for nearly 50,000 low-propensity Latino voters.

**Moving forward, we offer the following considerations for the coalition and its stakeholders:**

- Pay attention to strengthening One Arizona’s internal capacity;
- Be very deliberate about expanding the Latino electorate while growing to include other New American Majority populations;
- Carefully test a proactive policy agenda as not to lose the civic-engagement big tent;
- Spark excitement by being more creative in engaging voters;
- Build and strengthen a leadership-development ladder;
- Expand to more parts of the state methodically;
- Pay attention to building the capacity of partner organizations, especially those more nascent;
- Leverage existing partnerships to advance civic engagement in schools; and
- For funders, recognize the importance of continued and consistent support.

Arizona is well on its way to becoming a majority-minority state. The Latino population is growing rapidly, and this growth represents an unprecedented opportunity to transform the state’s policies and priorities. If SB 1070 has taught Latinos anything, it’s that civic engagement matters greatly—and that a coalition such as One Arizona can transform the state’s civic environment to be more inclusive for Latinos and for all Arizonians. But significant resources are needed if the Latino vote is to achieve its promise.

# 1. Introduction

After the state legislature passed the anti-immigrant SB 1070, ten nonprofit organizations—ACE, AZAN, BAN, CASE, DUSA, MFV, PAZ, Puente, Southwest Conference UCC and PAFCO—banded together to form the nonpartisan One Arizona, aimed at promoting full electoral participation of Latino citizens, especially infrequent and first-time voters.

*Our communities have come to trust us to fight for them and demystify the very confusing process. A lot of times, we will knock on doors, and people will say, “I don’t even know how to fill out a voter registration form. I am so glad you came to help me figure this out.”*

—One Arizona community partner

In 2013, One Arizona expanded its constituent group to include the New American Majority, defined as citizens ages 18–30 and unmarried women. One Arizona continues to focus on voter registration, voter mobilization, and election protection.

After five years of continued funding, One Arizona’s two leading funders—Unbound Philanthropy and the Four Freedoms Fund—commissioned this study and evaluation of One Arizona, seeking to document One Arizona’s accomplishments, assess the partnership’s impact on the state’s pro-immigrant movement, and reflect on lessons learned from the One Arizona experience to (1) inform future 501(c)(3) investments in civic participation in Arizona and other states and (2) inform and strengthen the effectiveness of its future activities.

*The existence of One Arizona and its commitment to having organizations that represent the rights of working people and immigrants in the state have added to the fabric of power for families. It can’t be discounted. They’ve helped build an infrastructure that advances the vehicle of participation in the state.*

—Immigrant-rights ally



This evaluation study contains three main parts. The first section offers a sociopolitical historical context, followed by the story of One Arizona's formation, and, using perspectives of stakeholders drawn from interviews, locates the key ingredients that were present in the collaborative for it to survive, thrive, and succeed.

The second section examines the outcomes of One Arizona's work, containing both quantitative and qualitative data. This section imparts a quantitative analysis of the last five years of One Arizona's voter registration and turnout efforts as well as the most meaningful ways to measure impact.

The third and final section looks forward and highlights key considerations and recommendations for One Arizona's next five years.

## 2. Methodology

Two bodies of unique research, one quantitative and the other qualitative, supported this effort. We conducted 28 structured one-on-one interviews with key stakeholders: thirteen One Arizona members, including six founding members; six allies in the immigrant rights field; three elected officials; five funders; and one capacity builder. There were also meetings with One Arizona's executive committee and staff, and a focus group with a dozen participants, as well as a review of documents and reports regarding the table's work. Interviews took place between January and March 2016. The evaluation team also documented One Arizona's theory of change, which outlined its assumptions, vision, strategies, and the short- and long-term outcomes that guided the evaluation inquiry.



Accompanying the qualitative study, Tom K. Wong, assistant professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego, conducted a statistical analysis of five years of voter engagement strategies and turnout results, with a year-by-year analysis of One Arizona's various activities. The top lines of the voter data and analysis are included here; the detailed voter data report is attached as an appendix.



# PART ONE:

## Context and Formation of One Arizona

### Background and Political Context

#### Early History of Mexicans in Arizona

The current climate for Latinos in Arizona has deep roots, stretching back to the politically charged history of Mexican-American civic and political incorporation into the United States. The signing of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo marked the end of the Mexican-American War—at the time, the bloodiest and costliest war in American history<sup>1</sup>—and established a new border between the two nations, ceding to the United States one-third of Mexico's territory. Comprising all or part of what was to become ten separate states (Texas, California, Nevada, Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona), the land Mexico ceded was greater in size than the nations of Germany and France combined. Even more significantly, this early history of war, conquest, and annexation had a powerful impact on how Latinos were initially incorporated into what was to become the American Southwest.

As historian David Gutiérrez observes, “in the half century following the annexation of Mexico’s former northern provinces, the ethnic Mexican population of the region was slowly but surely relegated to an inferior, caste-like status.... Mexicans were gradually divested of both political and economic influence.<sup>2</sup>... By the turn of the century most Mexican Americans found themselves in a position in society not much better than that occupied by Indians and African Americans elsewhere in the United States.”<sup>3</sup>


*Arizona was part of Mexico long before, so there was a native Latino population, and then immigrants came from California for cheaper costs of living. A power structure of ranchers and miners became entrenched, and there was a backlash against immigrants—a mass perception that Latinos can’t vote. White folks didn’t differentiate Latinos who are voters from undocumented immigrants here a year.*

—One Arizona partner

1. David G. Gutiérrez, *Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics of Ethnicity* (University of California, 1995), p. 13.

2. The exception to this drastic loss of political and economic influence was northern New Mexico and south Texas, where Mexican-Americans continued to hold large numerical majorities until the late nineteenth century. See *Walls and Mirrors*, p. 14.

3. Ibid., pp. 13-14.



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This experience of economic displacement, racialization, and prejudice was certainly present in Arizona, where Mexican-Americans lost ranches and family farms throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as the transcontinental railroad allowed financial interests from the East Coast and Western Europe to convert and export the state's natural resources. The period between the arrival of the railroads and World War II marked Arizona's "extractive period," historian Thomas Sheridan notes, in which "the railroads, copper companies, cotton farmers, and ranchers dominated Arizona politics and pitted 'Mexican' and 'Anglo' workers against one another to break up unions and keep wages down."<sup>4</sup>

*As soon as they got all the ore out of the mountains and didn't need immigrant labor, they deported them. That's the pattern here. It happened with farmworkers, in the lettuce capital in Yuma County, all of the workers were from across the border: Let's invite them in to do the mining, harvesting, grow our crops, build our houses. When the economy tanks, they get beat up and seen as taking too much health care and school resources, committing crime, raping our women, killing our officials.*

—One Arizona founding partner

4. Thomas Sheridan, *Arizona: A History* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012). See also *Beloved Land: An Oral History of Mexican Americans in Southern Arizona*, edited by Patricia Preciado Martin (University of Arizona Press, 2004).

This history of scapegoating and racial exclusion continued into the early years of the Great Depression, when much of Arizona's Anglo population, "including labor union members and state officials, placed the blame for skyrocketing unemployment and low wages on 'alien' Mexican workers."<sup>5</sup> In their efforts to protect the status of "white citizen workers," Arizona unions and politicians pressured the U.S. Department of Labor to "restrict immigration and initiate a nationwide 'repatriation' campaign during which some half million Mexican immigrants, and thousands of Mexican Americans, were deported."<sup>6</sup> In sum, despite being indigenous to the Southwest, Mexicans in Arizona have a long history of being perceived as "foreign" regardless of the time and mode of their incorporation into the United States or their subsequent status as citizens of this nation.<sup>7</sup>

This early history of Latinos often being perceived as an economic and racial threat has continued to shape the context for Latino politics and community organizing in Arizona, the Southwest, and throughout the United States.<sup>8</sup>

### **A Reputation for Extremism: Barry Goldwater, Sheriff Joe, and Donald Trump**

Barry Goldwater, running for president in 1964, launched the rise of the modern conservative movement from his U.S. Senate seat, and his far-right views set

the tone for Arizona politics. Moreover, as retirees ("snowbirds") began flowing into Phoenix and other cities, conflicts between the state's distinct populations became increasingly heated—and visible—as Arizona began developing an unwelcome reputation as a site of extremism and intolerance.

In 1972, Gov. Jack Williams signed a bill barring farmworkers from striking and boycotting during harvest season; when the United Farm Workers protested, he remarked, "As far as I'm concerned, those people don't exist."<sup>9</sup> In 1987, Gov. Evan Mecham put the state in the national spotlight by canceling the paid Martin Luther King Jr. holiday and was removed from office following conviction in his impeachment trial of charges of the obstruction of justice and the misuse of government funds (inspiring Public Enemy's furious "By the Time I Get to Arizona").

Raising temperatures across the board, in 1992, Maricopa County voters elected Joe Arpaio as sheriff, and the self-declared "America's Toughest Sheriff" has been one of the state's most prominent political figures ever since. Even as strong dissent persisted, this impression of Arpaio set in, reinforced by periodic flare-ups, usually with racial issues at the center.

In 2005, Arizona became the nation's epicenter of anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy when Sheriff Arpaio—by now this generation's Bull Connor, the national

5. Eric V. Meeks, "Protecting the 'White Citizen Worker': Race, Labor, and Citizenship in South-Central Arizona, 1929-1945," *Journal of the Southwest* 48(1), Spring 2006, p. 93.

6. Ibid., p. 91.

7. See Suzanne Oboler, *Ethnic Labels, Latino Lives: Identity and the Politics of Re(Presentation in the United States)* (University of Minnesota Press, 1995), pp. 17-18 and Cristina Beltrán, *The Trouble with Unity: Latino Politics and the Creation of Identity* (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 7.

8. For more on this concept of Latinos as a racial threat, see Leo R. Chavez, *The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the Nation* (Stanford University Press, 2008).

9. United Farm Workers, "¡History of Si Se Puede!", [www.ufw.org/\\_board.php?mode=view&b\\_code=cc\\_his\\_research&b\\_no=5970](http://www.ufw.org/_board.php?mode=view&b_code=cc_his_research&b_no=5970).



photo: Wealth Daily

face of anti-immigrant sentiment—began loudly promoting his department’s aggressive practices targeting suspected undocumented immigrants, as well as his extreme, and TV-ready, punishments for suspects and convicts alike. The same year, a loose confederation of armed citizens calling themselves Minutemen drew attention by engaging in vigilante border patrols that called for “hunting down” migrants.<sup>10</sup>

*I started organizing professionally in 2003. For the next five years, we got our asses handed to us. In 2008, a handful of people sat back and said, “We don’t think we know how to fight this fight.”*

*—One Arizona community partner*

In 2004, Arizona voters passed Proposition 200, requiring individuals to produce proof of citizenship before registering to vote or applying for public benefits. Proof of citizenship included a state driver’s license issued on or after October 1, 1996, the date from which Arizona licenses were required to contain social security numbers.

**“There were successive attacks. Proposition 200 was the first, and when they got away with that, they launched anti-immigrant strategies nationwide. When they couldn’t win nationally, they turned to a local strategy, picking off little things: making it illegal to rent to undocumented, taking away bail and bond rights—things that chip away at the quality of life of Latino immigrant communities.”**

10. Carla Marinucci and Mark Martin, “Governor endorses Minutemen on border,” San Francisco Chronicle, April 29, 2005, [www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Governor-endorses-Minutemen-on-border-He-parts-2685866.php](http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Governor-endorses-Minutemen-on-border-He-parts-2685866.php)

The climax came in April 2010, when Gov. Jan Brewer signed SB 1070, at that time the country's strictest anti-immigration bill, which notoriously granted police officers power to detain anyone they suspected of illegally being in the country. The Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund predicted that the law would create "a spiral of pervasive fear, community distrust, increased crime and costly litigation, with nationwide repercussions."<sup>11</sup> The state legislature followed SB 1070 the next month by pushing through a bill aiming to ban ethnic studies in state schools, written specifically to target the Tucson system's Chicano-studies program.<sup>12</sup>

*Before One Arizona, Latinos had no political power. We were underrepresented in the statehouse and legislature, and this allowed SB 1070 to be pushed through the legislature. It remains a bleak landscape, with no Democrat or Latino elected to statewide office.*

*—One Arizona community partner*



photo: The Pew Charitable Trusts

Other states have followed AZ's lead in adopting anti-immigrant policies following Prop 200, and five states passed SB 1070-like laws: Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah.<sup>13</sup> And the state's activists began mustering their resolve.

*It brought a lot more urgency to our lives; it made it a real threat, less hypothetical, from, "It could happen" and, "It's gonna happen" to, "It just happened." It was personal for me, since my family and I were undocumented at that time. We had two options: leave and go back to our country or stay and fight and be part of the solution. Everybody around felt the urgency, and it brought us together. It was a no-brainer to build the political power to get the right type of legislation rather than the kind that harms our community.*

*—One Arizona community partner*

After 2015 presidential campaign attacks on Mexico pushed fear of illegal immigration to the top of the political debate (notwithstanding the fact that fewer undocumented people than ever are entering the United States<sup>14</sup>), it surprised few when the 2016 Arizona presidential primary election focused on building a "wall" along the border. Controversy lingered, as state officials found themselves at the center of a national discussion about voter disenfranchisement and suppression: Maricopa County had slashed the number of election polling places by 85 percent since 2008, which many saw as targeting Latino voters

11. Randal C. Archibold, "Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration," *The New York Times*, April 23, 2010, <http://nyti.ms/oF31fs>.
12. Nicole Santa Cruz, "Arizona bill targeting ethnic studies signed into law," *Los Angeles Times*, May 12, 2010, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/12/nation/la-na-ethnic-studies-20100512>.
13. Ian Gordon and Tasneem Raja, "164 Anti-Immigration Laws Passed Since 2010? A MoJo Analysis," *Mother Jones*, March/April 2012, [www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/03/anti-immigration-law-database](http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/03/anti-immigration-law-database).
14. Jeffrey S. Passel and D'Vera Cohn, "Unauthorized immigrant population stable for half a decade," Pew Research Center, July 22, 2015, <http://pewrsr.ch/1JfmaWK>.

in particular.<sup>15</sup> And continuing his predecessor's legacy of anti-immigrant legislation, Gov. Doug Ducey signed a bill that extended the criminal sentences of undocumented immigrants.<sup>16</sup>

Yet despite Arizona's long history of anti-immigrant policies and nativist rhetoric, Latinos and other progressive allies have never stopped organizing aggressively for a society that reflects the state's best impulses rather than its worst. Arizona's activists have refused to give up.

SB 1070 inspired massive demonstrations after its passage<sup>17</sup> and a boycott for years afterward, until the Supreme Court largely invalidated the law. And the law helped birth One Arizona.

*Arpaio was terrorizing our community, and voters' rights were being taken away. SB 1070 was the last straw—it forced us, and the funders, to look at the situation in a different way.*

*—One Arizona founding partner*

The 2010 law proscribing ethnic-studies courses led to a nationwide movement to promote such teaching.<sup>18</sup> And in 2011, community activists scored a tangible victory (not through the nonpartisan One Arizona table) when voters recalled state Sen. Russell Pearce, the primary sponsor of SB 1070 and other anti-immigrant legislation.<sup>19</sup>

*Recalling Pearce was the turning point. The One Arizona C3 was relatively new, and [some individuals in the community] were in the middle of forming the C4. When the recall happened, we created an independent expenditure committee and pulled together SEIU, Every Voice, and a public campaign action fund, with C3s doing registration, and we saw a path to beat Pearce—and we did it, by 12 points. The groups that didn't participate were embarrassed, and they were more eager to be involved going into the 2012 cycle. That was the big win that set the stage for everything since.*

*—One Arizona founding partner*

**The backlash had finally arrived: Arizona's recent history of being a bellwether for anti-immigration policies, laced with ugly rhetoric and policies, created a political crisis that galvanized Latino and progressive communities—and helped create an enduring activist infrastructure.**

15. Griselda Nevarez, "Arizona: At Hearing, Latinos Demand Answers to Primary Voting Problems," NBC News, March 29, 2016, <http://nbcnews.to/1USwJVv>; Sari Horwitz, "Democratic Party and Clinton campaign to sue Arizona over voting rights," *The Washington Post*, April 14, 2016, <http://wpo.st/6wVU1>.

16. Kendal Blust, "Rhetoric over immigrants prompts new wave of legislation," *Arizona Daily Star*, April 10, 2016, <http://bit.ly/1W00404>.

17. Nicholas Riccardi, "Thousands in Phoenix protest Arizona's immigration law," *Los Angeles Times*, May 29, 2010, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/29/nation/la-na-arizona-protest-20100529-42>.

18. J. Weston Phippen, "How One Law Banning Ethnic Studies Led to Its Rise," *The Atlantic*, July 19, 2015, [www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/07/how-one-law-banning-ethnic-studies-led-to-rise/398885/](http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/07/how-one-law-banning-ethnic-studies-led-to-rise/398885/).

19. Amanda J. Crawford, "Arizona Immigration-Law Author Pearce Loses in Recall Election," *Bloomberg*, Nov. 9, 2011, [www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-09/arizona-senate-s-immigration-law-author-pearce-loses-in-recall-election](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-09/arizona-senate-s-immigration-law-author-pearce-loses-in-recall-election).

# One Arizona Emerges

## ***¡Ya basta! Enough is enough!***

In the wake of SB 1070, ten community organizations came together to form One Arizona, agreeing on a collaborative pact to ensure accountability and leverage the best from each community partner to increase civic engagement, power, and safety for Arizona's vulnerable Latino and immigrant communities. The ten community organizations—ACE, AZAN, BAN, CASE, DUSA, MFV, PAZ, Puente, Southwest Conference UCC and PAFCO—appointed MFV program director Francisco Heredia to serve as One Arizona's table director as he maintained his responsibilities with MFV. With the exception of a brief period in 2012 and again in 2013, Mr. Heredia served as table director until fall 2015 when Ian Danley succeeded him.

*The impetus of founding One Arizona was not only SB 1070 but the decades of attacks on immigrants: English-only in 2004, voter suppression, denying benefits to undocumented, in-state students, and bail and bonds. The community realized, “¡Ya basta!” Enough is enough. We tried to maximize the opportunity that SB 1070 brought, using it to rally and organize around.*

*—One Arizona founding partner*

## **Overcoming distrust**

It's all too common for activists to engage in turf wars, and Arizona's were no exception. Decades of grassroots organizing had been carried out mostly in silos, with advocates focusing on particular issues.

*Prior to SB 1070 and the development of One Arizona, there was a real reputation in the advocacy community for division and disorganization, with infighting and competition for attention and resources.*

*—Arizona elected official*

Competition for funding proved to be a predictably sticky issue—one that the new table helped to solve.

*There is always the shadow of the looming funding world that makes us all compete against each other. The One Arizona table provided member groups a way to overcome that challenge by seeking joint funding on [advocacy issues our groups work on]. There were ideological differences, but we agreed on one thing—we all wanted to increase civic participation as One Arizona.*

*—One Arizona founding partner*

One Arizona was able to help groups coalesce and move from a “toxic culture of in-fighting, competition, stepping on each other's toes” toward a more aligned, collaborative, and united movement focused on increasing Latino voter engagement, turnout, and power.

*Good work was happening, but not enough strategy or coordination was happening behind the resources, and resentment was growing across different relationships and organizations, most of it centered on the lack of accountability. We knew we were doing things sloppily but couldn't measure the impact any of us was having in the electoral front; nobody had those relationships. We were all stressed working in a very toxic environment, and bad culture sank in between us. One Arizona offered us a space to leverage collectively for more resources and training, offering a route for clear accountability across organizations.*

*—One Arizona founding partner*

**“The biggest challenge was agreeing on strategy. There was a lot of mistrust between the groups—who was deciding strategy and turf and precincts—for the first two or three years. Now, the groups lean on each other and build on each other, working on civic engagement.”**

The state’s high-profile anti-immigrant legislation and political figures brought national attention—welcome, of course, but complicating local groups’ efforts to coordinate and maximize effectiveness.

*When Gov. Brewer signed SB 1070 into law, national groups woke up to the challenge, and several of them parachuted into the state. A lot of Arizona groups felt, “Where were you when we needed you in the springtime?” There was considerable tension, especially since the national groups selected who they worked with. It was an ugly situation. After 1070 became law, there was a big protest march through Phoenix; it was really impressive—100,000 people marching through the streets—but unfortunate that, behind the scenes, there was so much competition between what the march organizers and what other groups were doing. There were competing events all happening around the state capitol, which wasn’t pretty. Everybody hated SB 1070 and these anti-immigrant measures, but they didn’t know how to work together.*

*—One Arizona funder partner*



### Funders step up

One Arizona represented the first coordinated effort to align advocacy organizations’ vision and strategies. Four Freedoms Fund (FFF) offered critical seed funding at the very beginning for the project to develop in its first two years. FFF listened for, identified, and then invested in three shared areas of capacity building for One Arizona—communications, organizing, and voter engagement training—that lessened the burden on individual organizations. Unbound Philanthropy made its first grant to One Arizona in 2012, and these two funding sources have been One Arizona’s mainstay funding sources up to now.

*Funders brought in a couple of things that we don’t see in other tables: expertise in running voter engagement campaigns and in communications—messaging, graphics, mailings, how to best use the Spanish media to communicate with our community. They took away some of the funding, but also took away a lot of the fighting.*

*—One Arizona founding partner*

Bringing aboard Crossroads Campaigns, managing consultant of We Are America Alliance, proved enormously helpful both in adding expertise and relieving administrative pressure.

*With John Miyasato and Crossroads, we got someone to help us develop a plan and program, train people, and communicate actual costs to funders. The fact that someone else was going to take on these tasks and free us to focus on voter registration—that was music to my ears.*

—One Arizona founding partner

*Crossroads, as an impartial participant, made a significant contribution: They were able to say whether a plan was viable or not, and help us carve up turf.*

—One Arizona founding member

The capacity building support enabled One Arizona member groups and activists to link their own stories with engaging Latino voters and tracking data.

*New Organizing Institute showed us how to tell our story, recruit, have one-on-one conversations with community folk, and build an empowered team within the community. We began tracking how we talked to individuals and became experts at data management, seeing what works and what doesn't. Being fearless is good, but being data-driven—knowing what types of messaging hit home with families—is very significant.*

—One Arizona community partner

## **One Arizona: Outcomes, Achievements, Successes**

Interviews with twenty-eight key stakeholders and twelve partners in a focus group highlight the core ingredients that allowed the One Arizona table to form, endure, and remain effective, from nonpartisan year-round voter engagement and clear accountability mechanisms to coordinating with groups that had a clear advocacy agenda strategies and changing the way targeted citizens view democracy itself. Perhaps most important: One Arizona's guidance has helped encourage, develop, and train a large number of young activists, creating a new, committed generation of leadership.

### **A vision for building Latino power**

One Arizona began with a Latino focus: nurturing the interests and concerns of Latino and immigrant communities by building Latino political power, including boosting voter participation.

*It wasn't a progressive agenda that brought us together. We see people of color marginalized even in progressive environments. So we formed around Latinos voting and prioritized that issue. Especially when the policy and environment in Arizona is formed around racialized attacks and dynamics, this response*

*makes sense. To ignore the racialized dynamics would be to ignore what is creating the problem in the first place.*

*—One Arizona staffer*

*We're always asked to join other efforts, but Latino voices do not get nurtured. It's not like we don't recognize white progressive voices, but we're aiming to focus the table on Latino voices from the beginning: to register Latinos to vote and put them on the Permanent Early Voter List.*

*—One Arizona community partner*

In coming together as a visible, vocal force for power in Latino and immigrant communities, One Arizona orchestrated a powerful ongoing act of resistance against state terror on immigrants and those who look like they could be immigrants. The group also has served as an important point of reference in a national arena, with resistance to anti-immigrant policy in Arizona serving as the "spark that lights a fire" nationally.

*For me, it moved people from fear to hope, from desperation to intentionality, from despair to courage.*

*—One Arizona founding partner*

## **Year-round civic engagement focus**

In targeting nonpartisan voter registration, early voting, turnout, and voter protection, One Arizona looks to boost the vote share of the New American Majority electorate, especially Latino voters.

**"That's what I am most proud of: We are bringing more people to the table."**

*Our organization is specifically concerned with vulnerable communities: elderly, kids, residents that make \$20,000 and below. It's a difficult demographic to work with—they're more transient, or even homeless, and 70 percent are not registered to vote. When we are reaching out to people who are disconnected and uninformed, we have only a few minutes to inspire and educate and galvanize and try to create an ongoing connection. Our work is trying to tell them that they can have influence in the political process. That's what I am most proud of: We are bringing more people to the table.*

*—One Arizona community partner*

## **Clear accountability mechanisms**

From the start, the collaborative effort depended on accountability and transparency, matching commitment to capacity and demanding results, identifying and setting goals and then using data to keep each table member accountable.

*In the beginning, organizations claimed to do more work than capacity dictated. So part of the growing pains was creating mechanisms for organizations to be truthful about what they can do.*

*—One Arizona community partner*

*The table has insisted on us using the Voter Activation Network, and I love it. If you claim to reach thirty thousand people but the VAN shows only fifteen thousand, you get paid for fifteen thousand. Having technical assistance and holding folks accountable—calling out groups that are not doing what they said—has been key.*

*—One Arizona community partner*

## Strong, connected relationships across organizations and campaigns

One Arizona has played the important role of linking individuals across organizations, strengthening existing relationships.

*We had all worked on immigrant rights together, but not in a coordinated way. That commonality of issue—and fights that we had been in—created trust.*

—One Arizona staff

*I give a lot of credit to the funders for believing in the possibility to begin with. That risk has paid off. Very quickly we learned there's a path—not just protests and marches but including a civic engagement path to engage people in change. Organizations in the table understood we're much stronger together.*

—One Arizona founding partner

## Funders adding value beyond grants

Stakeholders agree: Consistent, durable funding from Four Freedoms Fund and Unbound Philanthropy has kept organizational leaders at the table in spite of past grudges and differences in organizing approaches, histories, priorities, and missions. Beyond that, funders have played an active role in lifting up the organizations' work, brokering relationships and introducing additional funding.

*A couple of organizations I can't stand to be in the same room with, so it hasn't always been perfect or easy. I've learned about patience and perseverance. At moments I feel everyone in the coalition have hated me, but I didn't leave the conversation or the table.*

—One Arizona founding partner

*Four Freedoms Fund has offered assessment and board training. People don't understand all of the demands of being an executive director, and providing consultants for EDs has been critical. Coalitions are really hard! To run them, you have to have thick skin, be very strategic, and understand the politics. If you're the ED, you don't have anyone to talk to, and normally EDs don't run to funders because they might punish you for having problems. There's a pretty remarkable relationship between One Arizona and Four Freedoms and Unbound Philanthropy.*

—One Arizona community partner

The character of this funding partnership—with funders offering care, respect, encouragement, and space for work to mature—should not be downplayed. Funders became partners by not leaving—and by listening carefully and learning; they were able to strike a balance between being circumspect and encouraging, between making suggestions and having ownership.

*It's not an easy task to working in a coalition while building and sustaining your own organization. Groups sometimes find it hard to share their vulnerabilities and organizational capacities; it takes a lot of courage to work in this environment, and at the end of the day, they still have to build their own organizations. One Arizona is not going to sustain them. You don't want the money to be the thing that drives everything. And as a funder, you cannot have a specific agenda, demanding a certain result. It's really important for funders not to be overly ambitious or prescriptive. We might offer friendly advice or suggest this or that, as long as they're moving in the direction for the common good, and you have to be patient to ride over the bumps; they have to work things out among themselves. Don't look over their shoulders.*

—One Arizona funder partner

## Capacity-building support

From the outset, funders provided technical assistance in three primary areas: field program expertise from John Miyasato of Crossroads Campaign to develop a voter engagement and tracking system, including assigning territory, support in communications and messaging for the Spanish-speaking community from Torres Marquez, and finally, training from the New Organizing Institute.

*Because of support and training that One Arizona has provided for us as partners, we have been able to develop volunteers to do data, go from paper to iPads, do charts, mobilize classmates, and conduct voter registration marathons. It's how I know how to navigate, cut turf, analyze data, report data, work with social media. I have been part of groups that were more interested in growing recognition than in other organizations in the coalition. One Arizona invests in us to make One Arizona better.*

—One Arizona community partner

*We'll play the bad cop when needed, trying to make sure all the groups are working with an even playing field, so everyone has a fair chance and a set of common standards to do their organizing. That's what built a lot of trust with the vast majority of the groups. It's really good to see how much they work together now. You could feel the sense of competition in 2010, but now there's a ton of trust, and they've become one organization in many ways—not just a coalition but a family.”*

—Capacity builder

## Using data to inform and adjust field strategies

A sharp focus on hard data is built into the architecture of the collaborative; organizing efforts are numbers-driven. This has made

it possible to project and measure impact and better design campaign strategy. Table partners have access to the Voter Activation Network, a collective vehicle to store and review data, which had been typically available only to large entities such as a national political party, and can maximize efforts to reach people.

**Before the One Arizona table, groups tried to do this work on our own. We were duplicating efforts and in each other's turf, not as data-driven as we should have been, with duplication of registration efforts and big margins of error. Now, each group can dig into the areas in which it wants to strategically build: the immigration fight, Fight for 15, unionizing hotel workers.**

—One Arizona founding partner

## Neutral space where different roles and strategies are respected

The table comprises a range of organizations that utilize strategies ranging from civic engagement to direct-service provision. One Arizona provides a neutral, safe space where partners can discuss campaigns, goals, desired outcomes, and who's doing what.

*I can bring in ideas and use the table as a testing ground. The table can help flesh out ideas and provide a space for groups to work together.*

*—Focus group participant*

**We're all clearer now which organizations do which things well when it comes to the work: direct action, know-your-rights training, communications, legislation tracking, and voter registration. With a general collaborative infrastructure, we trust each other and can find our lanes.**

**—One Arizona founding partner**

## Building long-term, sustainable political power

One Arizona's efforts have awakened elected officials and governing bodies to the significance of Latino voters' concerns. This introduced a new accountability loop: Officeholders must now be responsive to a broader segment of Arizona's voting population than before, translating into real systems change and a transformed political landscape.

*The table has changed the game. Now Arizona's legislature sees us as a force to be reckoned with; when they propose legislation that is harmful to the community, they must strategize around the table and its partners. We did not have this power and leverage a couple of years ago.*

*—Consultant and adviser*

*We have been able to change the dynamics of how candidates campaign. Historically, they have focused on high-efficacy white voters, but after our field programs and turnout efforts, they must look to underrepresented areas as well. If you invest, you can change the rules and electorate, and now there's actual data of how it can be done.*

*—One Arizona founding member*

Efforts don't stop with One Arizona's coordinated work, or with member groups' direct action—with the table as a platform, raising awareness and consciousness, activists have empowered individuals and independent groups.

*We've been able to show people that we can be a force. Even though numbers do not support us in a lot of areas in the state, we can have a say in the places that are ours: Phoenix and to the south. We have seen more people of color elected; we have seen more people of color in the organizations thriving and growing; more people are speaking up in our communities.*

*—One Arizona founding partner*

*Winning elections is not the end—it's the means. It's policy that's the end. And advocacy after each election to make sure the political power and strength is located within the organizations or the party or elected officials—and within the community, to hold politicians accountable.*

*—One Arizona community partner*

One Arizona's infrastructure and network provides both an anchor and an incubator, supporting new partnerships and endeavors. Most often cited by stakeholders in this light: One Arizona's DACA DAPA Implementation Working Group and Arizona's Student Vote Coalition.

*We want to be the incubator, the place where young organizations come together and get tools and resources and take over the world.*

*—One Arizona community partner*



20. Sasha Constanza-Chock, "Youth and Social Movements: Key Lessons for Allies," Kinder & Braver World Project, Dec. 7, 2012, [http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/KBWYouthandSocialMovements2012\\_0.pdf](http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/KBWYouthandSocialMovements2012_0.pdf)

## **Developing leaders to pave the way to a new Arizona**

Powerful social movements that have transformed the course of human history have always had young people in leadership. In this country, the role of young leaders have been deeply important to every progressive social movement, including the civil-rights movement, the transnational LGBTQ movement, successive waves of feminism, environmentalism and environmental justice, and the labor, antiwar, and immigrant-rights movements.<sup>20</sup> One Arizona can count the development of young leaders as one of its key achievements.

**In 2006, I came in as a volunteer. Then I became a canvass leader—not involved in decision-making, just making sure all of my canvassers were trained. And now, with One Arizona's support, I am the program director in charge of our organization's statewide civic engagement work. In a sense, they created me, in the position I am today, and it has given me the chance to help some of our volunteers grow in the same way.**

**—One Arizona founding partner**

One Arizona successfully tapped into the righteous anger and resistance of Latino youth, organizing their energy to go out in 118-degree summer heat to knock on more than one million doors, and animating their imagination of an Arizona that believes in and respects them.

*In 2010, all of the organizations, because of the moment that we were in, were able to develop a strong pool of passionate volunteers who were directly affected by the issue. Those volunteers are now in leadership positions, like myself, and organizers and volunteers are constantly being developed to become the next cadre. One Arizona has really invested in individuals, getting the community involved, and we are seeing so many rewards in that. We're building lasting relationships with people who want to make community organizing a career path.*

—One Arizona community partner

One Arizona has provided an effective container in which volunteers have become organizers and assumed organizational and movement leadership. It has done so by providing three very concrete things: purposeful agenda, skills training, and space to build community.

*The training One Arizona provides is not just how to knock on doors but education on what it means to be a leader and an organizer. They're building these young people's organizational and leadership skills, cultivating a generation of leaders involved in something larger than themselves. Lots of them are undocumented and can't even vote, and here they are participating in the American democratic process! I haven't seen that since the farmworker movement and Cesar Chavez.*

—Elected official

Qualitative interviews make clear that—beyond winning elections and gaining electoral power—One Arizona's key achievement is recruiting and cultivating leaders, inspiring young Latinos and other activists to choose careers in the social sector and join the social justice movement.

*I would not be working in this movement if it weren't for One Arizona. I was fresh out of the Marine Corps when SB 1070 passed, and I was angry and went to the Capitol. I went from a volunteer to an executive director in less than four years. In helping to transition community members to community leaders, One Arizona has made social justice a viable career path for young people who might work for a small grassroots organization and build skills that are relevant and valuable. For me, the most valuable thing has been being given an opportunity to lead, to show what I could do, to show that given the right challenge and opportunity I can lead. If I didn't have those opportunities, I would be working at a bank or a corporation. We have talent, but without opportunities to harness that talent, we would lose a lot of individuals who can be extremely valuable in our movement.*

—One Arizona community partner

In a short amount of time, One Arizona has grown a vibrant, organic garden of capable leaders, giving them voice, methodology, and a tangible community.

*What impresses me is seeing these individuals grow as organizers and leaders. In 2015, a subset of the One Arizona table formed a working group to work with undocumented immigrants for President Obama's deferred action for parents of U.S.-born children, now being litigated in the Supreme Court. They've formed a table, using the habits they developed, like having a common calendar, materials, scheduling, and meetings, and can figure out divisions of labor and not trip over each other.*

—One Arizona community partner

The development and transformation of young leaders is steadily changing the game and paving the way to a new Arizona.



## PART TWO:

# Voter Engagement, Turnout, and PEVL Data



To understand One Arizona's impact on the state's electoral landscape, we now turn to an examination of voter data, and the clear conclusion:

**One Arizona's voter engagement efforts have consistently increased voter turnout. The impact is strongest among low-propensity Latino voters, meaning registered voters who do not usually vote. One Arizona has expanded the electorate by turning out low-propensity voters, and it consistently does so in the double digits. Furthermore, One Arizona's focus on increasing the number of low-propensity Latino and New American Majority voters to get them onto the Permanent Early Voter List (PEVL, or the equivalent of vote-by-mail), which is widely recognized as an effective way to overcome some of the barriers for low-income voters and voters of color.**

One Arizona deployed three focused strategies to engage voters and increase turnout:

1. They targeted low-propensity Latinos—those who are eligible but haven't registered, or registered but don't vote.
2. They made it a point to sign up low-propensity Latinos and New American Majority voters for PEVL so they can more easily vote by mail.
3. They used door-to-door canvassing and phone banks to encourage those registered to actually go vote.

From 2010 to 2015, we see the growth and maturation of One Arizona's voter engagement tactics. By moving away from less efficacious modes of voter outreach such as robocalls, by strategically targeting mailers, and by focusing direct contact efforts to door-to-door canvassing, One Arizona has been able to translate the success it has had during even-year federal elections (e.g., the 2010 midterm general election) to its work during odd-year municipal elections (e.g., the 2011 municipal elections in Phoenix) when voter turnout is normally lower than federal election years.

We begin with a year-by-year analysis of the voter data, followed by a summary of the five-year period of this evaluation study. The quantitative component in this study uses the bias-adjusted methodology, and evaluates three different measures of efficacy.

The intent-to-treat effect compares turnout among voters One Arizona successfully engaged and turnout among voters who were not

engaged. This measure does not account for the fact that some of the voters One Arizona attempted to contact were not engaged. It also does not account for the possibility that the voters One Arizona engaged were already more likely to vote. However, it is included because it is perhaps the most intuitive measure of efficacy.

The second measure, the instrumental variable method, uses contact rates to adjust for bias. It is included here because it is a familiar and commonly used measure in voter engagement Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs).<sup>21</sup> However, it is not likely to effectively adjust for bias for our purposes here given One Arizona did not determine who to attempt to engage using a random assignment procedure.<sup>22</sup>

The third measure, which is the most desirable, uses a statistical method referred to as inverse probability weighting. This method is designed for non-randomized observational studies, which is the category of research that the work of One Arizona falls under. This measure reweights the voters One Arizona successfully engaged to reflect the characteristics of the voters One Arizona did not attempt to contact—this ensures that the voters One Arizona successfully engaged are not a “stacked deck.”<sup>23</sup> Another strength of this approach is that we can “feed” the model multiple characteristics simultaneously. Altogether, the methods used subject One Arizona's voter engagement efforts to rigorous empirical tests.

The glossary of terms that follows provides a guide for readers who are not as familiar with these very specific voter data definitions.

21. For example, see Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment.” *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 03 (2000): 653–63.
22. This is a commonly used measure to evaluate the treatment effect of canvassing in a RCT. More specifically, an instrumental variable regression is used to estimate the effect of voter engagement on turnout. This method adjusts for bias in two steps. The first step is to model the likelihood of successfully engaging a voter using random assignment as an independent variable. The intuition here is that random assignment is related to whether a voter contact is attempted, but is not related to whether a voter votes. The results of the first stage analysis are then used to create a new variable—one that still reflects whether a voter is engaged, but is weighed differently based on contact rates—that is used to estimate a bias-adjusted treatment effect.
23. This proceeds in two steps. The first stage is to model the likelihood of contact by as many characteristics that we can feed the model. To illustrate, if we suspected that One Arizona was “stacking the deck” by engaging higher-propensity voters, the first stage model would include vote propensity as a factor.

## Glossary of Terms

### Attempted Voter Engagement (i.e., outreach attempts)

Defined as all efforts made to engage a voter. Attempted voter engagements come in different modes. The main modes include door-to-door canvassing, live phone banking, and mailers.

**Example: 1,000 attempted voter engagements.**

### Successful Voter Engagements

Not all attempted voter engagements are successful. For example, door knocks can go unanswered and phone numbers can be dialed but may be disconnected. A successful voter engagement thus refers to an attempted voter engagement that is coded as "canvassed."

**Example: 500 successful voter engagements.**

### Contact Rate


The contact rate is the number of successful voter engagements divided by the number of attempted voter engagements. Contact rates can vary widely, but a minimum 10% contact rate for door-to-door canvassing and 5% contact rate for live phone banking provide baselines.

**Example: 500 successful voter engagements divided by 1,000 attempted voter engagements equals a 50% contact rate.**

### Unique Voters

During a field program, one voter may be the target of multiple attempted voter engagements. For example, a voter may be included in a door-to-door canvassing effort, as well as in a live phone banking effort. The number of unique voters in a field program thus provides an indicator of the breadth of the field program.


**Example: 500 unique voters were targeted in 1,000 attempted voter engagements. In this scenario, each unique voter may have been included in a door-to-door canvassing effort and a live phone banking effort (e.g., 500 x 2).**



### Unique Voters Successfully Engaged

During a field program, contact rates provide an initial window into the breadth of a field program. However, unless we unpack the number of unique voters successfully engaged, it is difficult to evaluate the true breadth of an organization's voter engagement efforts.

**Example: Out of 500 unique voters targeted, 250 unique voters were successfully engaged.**



### Voter Turnout

The evaluation of voter engagement efforts center on metrics related to voter turnout. At the most basic level, voter turnout represents the percentage of registered voters in an electorate who voted.

**Example: 5,000 out of 10,000 registered voters voted, which represents 50% voter turnout.**

### Voter Turnout: Successfully Engaged


There is a strong impulse among organizations to evaluate their voter engagement efforts by focusing solely on turnout among those who were successfully engaged. However, for reasons discussed in the quantitative appendix, this metric paints an incomplete portrait of efficacy.

**Example: 150 out of 250 successfully engaged voters voted, which represents 60% voter turnout.**

### Intent-to-Treat Effect

The intent-to-treat effect is one common way, albeit an inadequate one (it does not adjust for potential bias, as explained in the quantitative appendix), to measure the impact of a voter engagement effort. In general, the intent-to-treat effect is voter turnout among those successfully engaged minus voter turnout among a comparison group selected from the general electorate.

**Example: 60% of voters successfully engaged voted compared to 50% of the rest of the electorate; thus the intent-to-treat effect is 10%.**



### Voter Turnout: Targeted But Not Engaged


In order to more fully evaluate efficacy, it is necessary to also look at turnout among those who were targeted, but were not successfully engaged. This begins the process of diagnosing whether the voters who were successfully engaged represent a biased sub-group of voters.

**Example: 175 out of 250 registered voters who were targeted but were not successfully engaged voted, which represents 70% voter turnout.**

### Voter Turnout: Comparable Non-Targeted Voters

As an additional step to more fully evaluate efficacy, it is also necessary to look at turnout among comparable voters who were not targeted. In the absence of a randomized control trial (RCT), these voters are used as a comparison group.

**Example: 300 out of 500 comparable voters who were not targeted voted, which represents 65% voter turnout.**



### Bias-Adjusted Treatment Effect

The main criticism of the intent-to-treat effect is that it does not take into account known sources of potential bias. More specifically, it does not address the likelihood that those successfully engaged were already more likely to vote. It also does not address the possibility that those successfully engaged differ significantly with respect to key demographic or socioeconomic characteristics. Whereas the intent-to-treat effect can overstate the efficacy of a voter engagement effort, bias-adjusted treatment effects provide closer approximations of the actual effect.

**Example: Adjusting for selection effect (i.e., already more likely to vote):**

$$t = \frac{Pe - Pc}{a}$$

**Where  $t$  is the treatment effect,  $Pe$  is turnout among the treatment group,  $Pc$  is turnout among the control group, and  $a$  is the response rate.**

**Here,  $Pe = a (Pr + t) + (1 - a) Pnr$ . Importantly, this means that turnout among those in the treatment group is a function of whether a voter is reachable. This is done using the instrumental variable method.**

**Adjusting for differences in key demographic and socioeconomic characteristics using the inverse probability weighting method for non-RCTs:**

**(1) Fit logistic regression model,  $Pr(\text{Contact} = 1|X)$ , wherein  $Pr$  represents the predicted probability of a successful engagement and  $X$  is a vector of individual-level characteristics;**

**(2)  $IPW = 1/Pr$ , which determines inverse probability weights for those successfully engaged;**

**(3)  $IPW = 1 - Pr$ , which determines inverse probability weights for those not engaged.**

## Year-by-Year Election Analysis

The following section is a year-by-year analysis of the voter engagement and turnout data for One Arizona, highlighting federal and local elections results across the various voter engagement modalities. Each year begins with what was at stake to provide some overall context. Table 1 summarizes the results.

**Table 1. 2010-2015 Voter Engagement and Turnout Results**

<b>Even-Year Federal Elections</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Bias-Adjusted Treatment Effect</b>	<b>Bias-Adjusted Treatment Effect: Latinos</b>
2010	November 2	General	10.1%	19.9%
2012	November 6	General	13.6%	19.6%
2014	November 4	General	6.1%	13.2%
<b>Odd-Year Municipal Elections</b>				
2011	August 30	Phoenix Municipal Primary	0.5% to 0.6%	6.4% to 6.6%
2011	November 8	Phoenix Municipal General	-1.2% to -0.8%	4.9% to 6.3%
2013	August 27	Phoenix Municipal Primary	8.5%	12.1%
2013	November 5	Phoenix Municipal General	Ns	6.5%
2015	August 25	Phoenix Municipal Primary	11.1%	17.1%

Ns = not statistically significant. Note: The treatment effect for even-year elections focuses on low-propensity voters. The range for the 2011 municipal elections reflects the results when including robocalls, and when excluding robocalls. 2011 was the only year in which One Arizona relied heavily on robocalls.

## 2010: SB 1070 Inspired Anger into Action— “¡Ya Basta! Enough!”

During this first year, One Arizona heavily targeted low-propensity Latino voters by knocking on each door two to three times, making repeated live and automated phone calls, and mailing voters campaign literature. A multicomponent communications plan that included paid, earned, and social media efforts complemented coalition field activities during the course of the campaign.

During the 2010 general election campaign, One Arizona made 1,159,018 attempted contacts to 298,981 unique voters; 86.8 percent of these unique voters were in Maricopa County, Pima County, and Yuma County.<sup>24</sup> Some 77.8 percent of the unique voters targeted during the 2010 general election were low-propensity voters;<sup>25</sup> 83.7 percent were Hispanic/Latino and 12.2 percent were Caucasian. Door-to-door canvassing, live phone banking, and mailers accounted for nearly all of the coalition’s attempted outreach. Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 24.1 percent of attempted contacts, live phone banking accounted for 30.4 percent, and mailers accounted for 38.4 percent. The door-to-door canvassing rate was 38.8 percent; the live phone banking contact rate was 25.1 percent.

One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts increased turnout among low-propensity voters by a strong 10.1 percent: Whereas, overall, 31.3 percent of low-propensity voters in Maricopa County, Pima County, and Yuma County voted during the 2010 general election, 41.4 percent of the low-propensity voters whom One Arizona successfully engaged voted.<sup>26</sup>



photo: Arasmus Photo/Wikimedia Commons

When focusing the analysis on low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters, the data shows an even stronger increase in turnout: a robust 19.9 percent. Whereas 21.2 percent of low-propensity Hispanics/Latinos in Maricopa County, Pima County, and Yuma County voted during the 2010 general election, 41.1 percent of the low-propensity Hispanics/Latinos whom One Arizona successfully engaged voted.

**The bottom line: In focusing on low-propensity Latinos—by definition the hardest voters to reach and mobilize—the One Arizona table brought almost 13,000 new voters to the electorate in 2010.**

24. Based on 240,856 voters for whom data is available. Such slippage is common. More specifically, as the amount of time increases between when a field program happens and when a data vendor requests data—be it from VAN (which One Arizona uses) or even a county registrar of voters—voter files inevitably change as people move, die, etc.

25. Based on 240,864 voters for whom vote history data is available

26. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa County, Pima County, and Yuma County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2010 general election.

## 2011: One Arizona is innovative, swift, precise, and growing

By deepening collaboration among partners, in taking seriously the lessons learned in the previous election cycle, and by being receptive to technical assistance, the Table built on the foundation it laid in 2010 during the following municipal primary campaign.

SB 1070, while under appeal, remained in effect. Sheriff Joe Arpaio announced that officers would patrol polling places to check for undocumented Mexicans voting. In response, One Arizona launched an election protection campaign, training and placing volunteers at polling places to mitigate Arpaio's strategy. At the local level, Phoenix elected progressive mayor Greg Stanton, and Daniel Valenzuela's City Council victory tipped the balance to a 5-to-4 progressive majority.

*Sheriff Arpaio made a TV commercial that he was going to patrol polling places, to make sure Mexicans were legally able to vote. We responded with an election protection program: We published in Spanish papers and went into the communities, people staffed outreach tables, and on election day we had people who were trained at the sites to answer questions.*

*—One Arizona community partner*

In 2011, partners and allies' civic engagement efforts began to bear fruit; the low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters mobilized by the table were instrumental in increasing Latino voter turnout. The coalition rolled out its first voter guide to help new voters in particular navigate the ballot.

**In 2011, partners and allies' civic engagement efforts began to bear fruit; the low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters mobilized by the table were instrumental in increasing Latino voter turnout.**

During the 2011 municipal primary election in Phoenix, One Arizona made 191,038 attempted contacts to 41,969 unique voters; 83.5 percent were Hispanic/Latino.<sup>27</sup> Attempted contacts were spread across door-to-door canvassing, live phone banking, mailers, and other modes of contact (mainly robocalls). Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 20.6 percent of attempted contacts, live phone banking accounted for 10.5 percent of attempted contacts, mailers accounted for 21.9 percent of attempted contacts, and other modes accounted for 46.9 percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate was 44.2 percent; the live phone banking contact rate was 40.6 percent.

27. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa County, Pima County, and Yuma County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2010 general election.

28. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 41,969 voters.

The data indicates that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2011 primary campaign in Phoenix had a modest effect of between 0.5 percent (when including robocalls) and 0.6 percent (when excluding robocalls) among all voters. But the results are drastically different when focusing on Hispanic/Latino voters: One Arizona's voter engagement efforts increased turnout among targeted Hispanic/Latino voters by between 6.6 percent (when including robocalls) and 6.4 percent (when excluding robocalls).<sup>28</sup>

Months later, during the general election campaign, One Arizona made 117,873 attempted contacts to 32,144 unique voters; 89.1 percent were Hispanic/Latino. Attempted contacts were spread across door-to-door canvassing, live phone banking, mailers, and other modes of contact (mainly robocalls). Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 19.4 percent of attempted contacts, live phone banking accounted for 5.1 percent of attempted contacts, mailers accounted for 30.8 percent of attempted contacts, and other modes accounted for 44.7 percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-door canvassing contact

rate was 33.9 percent; the live phone banking contact rate was 36.9 percent.

Analyzing all voters, the data indicates that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2011 municipal general election campaign in Phoenix did not increase turnout among targeted voters. However, similar to the pattern for the primary election, the results are drastically different when focusing only on Hispanic/Latino voters: The coalition's voter engagement efforts increased turnout among targeted Hispanic/Latino voters by between 4.9 percent (when including robocalls) and 6.3 percent (when excluding robocalls).

Overall, the turnout rate for low-propensity Latino voters lagged the general population, as might be expected, but the numbers were far closer than they would have been without One Arizona's efforts. In the August 2011 primary, overall turnout was 22.3 percent; 20 percent of low-propensity Latinos turned out. In the November general election, 28.6 percent of Phoenix voters turned out, against 21.4 percent of low-propensity Latino voters.



## 2012: Increasing impact, partnerships, perseverance

Nationally, 2012 saw big movement in immigration policy: President Obama announced the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program in June, in the middle of the election campaign. In Maricopa County, Sheriff Arpaio launched a re-election campaign.

One Arizona continued to grow and innovate, testing its ability to mobilize voters and increase turnout. Table members' experience with One Arizona enhanced their ability to secure funding support on

an individual basis from various funding sources that helped build the coalition's leadership and capacity. One Arizona launched its DACA workgroup, coalescing, coordinating, and growing DACA work across the state.

During the 2012 general election campaign, One Arizona made 366,090 attempted contacts to 205,828 unique voters; 88.9 percent of these unique voters were in Maricopa County and Pima County.<sup>29</sup> Two-thirds of the unique voters targeted by One



Arizona during the 2012 general election were low-propensity voters.<sup>30</sup> Some 81.5 percent were Hispanic/Latino; 15.3 percent were Caucasian. Door-to-door canvassing and live phone banking accounted for nearly all of One Arizona's attempted outreach. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate was 22.2 percent; the live phone banking contact rate was 8.3 percent.

The voters One Arizona successfully engaged during the 2012 general election campaign were statistically significantly more likely to vote than those One Arizona attempted to contact but were unable to reach; this holds true across the entire range of vote propensities. The data also shows that the low-propensity voters One Arizona successfully engaged were significantly more likely to vote than similar voters in Maricopa and Pima counties who were outside of the coalition's target universe.

During the 2012 general campaign, One Arizona's voter engagement efforts increased turnout among low-propensity voters by a robust 13.6 percent: Whereas 48.4 percent of low-propensity voters in Maricopa County and Pima County turned out during the 2012 general election, 62.0 percent of the low-propensity voters whom One Arizona successfully engaged cast ballots.<sup>31</sup>

When focusing the analysis on low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters, the data shows an even stronger increase in turnout of a robust 19.6 percent: 41.5 percent of low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters in Maricopa County and Pima County voted, against 61.1 percent of the low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters whom One Arizona successfully engaged.



**The voters One Arizona successfully engaged during the 2012 general election campaign were statistically significantly more likely to vote than those One Arizona attempted to contact but were unable to reach; this holds true across the entire range of vote propensities.**

In addition, by adapting and allowing different strategies based on available resources, One Arizona was able to streamline and focus efforts. Partners became more willing to assess realistic capacity, coordinate operations more cohesively, and provide support to each other.

29. Based on 322,657 voters for whom data is available.

30. Based on 315,625 voters for whom data is available.

31. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa County and Pima County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2014 general election.

## 2013: Maturing infrastructure, powerful coalition and coordination, expanded scope

In 2013, One Arizona was markedly better organized and more strategic, playing an important role in local elections.

During the municipal primary campaign in Phoenix, One Arizona made 129,554 attempted contacts to 33,456 unique voters; 92.4 percent were Hispanic/Latino.<sup>32</sup> Attempted contacts focused on door-to-door canvassing and live phone banking, with door-to-door canvassing accounting for 42.9 percent of attempted contacts and live phone banking accounting for the rest. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate was 31.3 percent; the live phone-banking rate was 19.4 percent. One Arizona's voter engagement efforts increased turnout among targeted voters by 8.5 percent and among targeted Hispanic/Latino voters by 12.1 percent.

In the general election campaign, One Arizona made 73,369 attempted contacts to 33,864 unique voters; 89.8 percent were Hispanic/Latino.<sup>33</sup> Attempted contacts focused on door-to-door canvassing and live phone banking, with door-to-door canvassing accounting for 58.8 percent of attempted contacts and live phone banking making up the rest. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate was 37.4 percent; the live phone banking contact rate was 11.7 percent.

The results suggest that, when analyzing all voters, One Arizona's engagement efforts in the 2013 municipal general election in Phoenix did not increase turnout among targeted voters. However, when focusing on Hispanic/Latino voters, the data shows that One Arizona increased turnout among targeted Latino voters by 6.5 percent.



**Latino voters in Phoenix increased their participation over previous years, largely owing to efforts to boost registration for the Permanent Early Voting List. In 2013, early voting accounted for close to 90 percent of all votes cast in the city of Phoenix.**

32. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 33,456 voters.

33. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 33,864 voters.

## 2014: Expanded vision and power with “Latino Plus”

In 2014, One Arizona moved to expand its focus from Arizona’s Latino electorate to encompass the New American Majority—a “Latino Plus” universe that includes unmarried women, young people, and people of color more broadly. The campaign, recognizing the value of early-voting registration, focused on signing up this larger universe of voters; One Arizona partners collaborated to sign up 10,000 current voters along with more than 13,000 new voters. This represented a bright spot in a down year: Nationwide, 2014 saw the lowest turnout of any election year since the early 1950s, and Latino voting numbers fell correspondingly.

Still, One Arizona took real steps, helping to form the Arizona Student Vote Coalition, a laboratory of sorts to innovate and test the potential power of the student vote; One Arizona offered the networks, partnerships, and skills necessary to bring it to fruition. With voter suppression on the rise, the coalition continued voter protection and education efforts through its voter guide and poll monitoring.

During the 2014 general election campaign, One Arizona made 551,270 attempted contacts to 231,565 unique voters; 97.8 percent of these unique voters were in Maricopa County and Pima County.<sup>34</sup> Some 62.1 percent of the unique voters targeted during the 2014 general election were low-propensity voters;<sup>35</sup> 74.9 percent were Hispanic/Latino, and 17.7 percent were Caucasian.

The low-propensity voters One Arizona successfully engaged were significantly more likely to vote than those in Maricopa and Pima counties who were outside the coalition’s target universe. However, the high-propensity voters One Arizona successfully engaged were significantly less likely

to vote than those in Maricopa and Pima counties outside of One Arizona’s target universe.

The data indicates that One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during the 2014 campaign increased turnout among low-propensity voters by a robust 6.1 percent: Only 16.4 percent of low-propensity voters in Maricopa and Pima counties voted during the 2014 general election, against 22.5 percent of those whom One Arizona successfully engaged.<sup>36</sup>

**For low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters, the data shows an even stronger 13.2 percent increase in turnout: Whereas just 9.4 percent of low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters in Maricopa and Pima counties voted during the 2014 general election, 22.6 percent of those whom One Arizona successfully engaged cast ballots.**

The coalition took steps to build capacity for future elections, hiring a part-time data staff to enter all voter registration, vote-by-mail signups, and pledge cards collected in the field, giving organizers a more accurate real-time analysis of its work on the ground.

34. Based on 215,527 voters for whom data is available.

35. Based on 215,534 voters for whom data is available.

36. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa County and Pima County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2014 general election.

## 2015: Enthusiasm, hope, solidarity, One Arizona wins and holds ground

Heading into its fifth year of civic engagement work, the One Arizona table looked to expand the power and influence of low-propensity Latino voters and Latino Plus voters in Arizona. In 2015, in both an odd-year municipal election and during a primary election that generally draws fewer voters, the coalition came out in force in Phoenix.

In Phoenix, during the municipal primary campaign, the coalition made 112,171 attempted contacts to 67,074 unique voters; 58.5 percent were Hispanic/Latino, and 29.8 percent were Caucasian.<sup>37</sup> Door-to-door canvassing comprised nearly all of One Arizona's attempted contacts during the 2015 municipal primary election in Phoenix; the canvassing contact rate was 22.3 percent.

**The data indicates that the coalition's voter engagement efforts increased turnout among targeted voters by 11.1 percent; when focusing the analysis on Hispanic/Latino voters, turnout rose a robust 17.1 percent.**

In Tucson, One Arizona made 28,444 attempted contacts to 19,380 unique voters; 73.8 percent were Hispanic/Latino, while 21.5 percent were Caucasian.<sup>38</sup> Attempted contacts focused exclusively on door-to-door canvassing; the canvassing contact rate was 31.4 percent.



37. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 67,074 voters.

38. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 19,380 voters.

## Summary of 2010 - 2015

From 2010 to 2015, One Arizona representatives made 3,004,804 attempted voter engagements,<sup>39</sup> with door-to-door canvassing, phone banking, and mailers<sup>40</sup> comprising 91 percent of these attempts. Out of all outreach attempts during the period under evaluation, the coalition made 1,046,357 successful voter contacts,<sup>41</sup> a contact rate of 35 percent.

From these outreach efforts, One Arizona successfully engaged 364,677 unique voters. Figure 1 depicts all of the coalition's outreach attempts during the period under evaluation, by mode of contact.




Figure 1.



39. 2,078 voters are marked as canvassed in the data but have no contact type entered.

40. This includes traditional bulk mail, as well as 3,511 postcards mailed in 2011.

41. Contacts refer to voters that have been canvassed by One Arizona. It also includes the "mailed" result code but excludes all other result codes.

## Permanent Early Voting List

During the period under evaluation, One Arizona had 256,983 total engagements, or contacts (encouraging people to sign up for PEVL, or encouraging those already on PEVL to actually vote) with 117,464 unique voters regarding vote-by-mail and/or early voting. Three-quarters of those voters, more than 80,000, were Hispanic/Latino.<sup>42</sup> This takes on added significance as advocates continue to see vote-by-mail and other early voting methods as concrete ways to address some of the obstacles to voting that voters of color and in particular low-income voters of color face.<sup>43</sup> Vote-by-mail has been shown to increase turnout in not only presidential and midterm elections<sup>44</sup> but also in local elections<sup>45</sup> and among people with disabilities.<sup>46</sup>

**Table 2. ONE Arizona Voter Engagement/Contact Demographics**

	Total	Percent
Latino	81,374	75.7
Caucasian	21,040	19.6
Other/Unknown	3,028	2.8
African-American	1,201	1.1
Asian	684	0.6

**Out of the more than 80,000 unique Hispanic/Latino voters the coalition has engaged regarding vote-by-mail and/or early voting, 61.4 percent are low-propensity or newly registered voters. In other words, One Arizona has used vote-by-mail to address obstacles to voting for nearly 50,000 low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters.**

42. Data on race and ethnicity is available for 107,426 voters.

43. As with most academic debates, there is no consensus in the literature. For an early review, see Paul Gronke, et al., "Convenience voting," *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (2008), pp. 437-55, [www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/08/Gronke2008-Convenience\\_Voting.pdf](http://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2013/08/Gronke2008-Convenience_Voting.pdf).

44. For example, see Sean Richey, "Voting by Mail: Turnout and Institutional Reform in Oregon," *Social Science Quarterly* 89.4 (2008), pp. 902-15. For a contrasting view, see Barry C. Burden, et al., "Election laws, mobilization, and turnout: The unanticipated consequences of election reform," *American Journal of Political Science* 58.1 (2014), pp. 95-109, <http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Ohio559.pdf>.

45. Thad Kousser and Megan Mullin, "Does voting by mail increase participation? Using matching to analyze a natural experiment," *Political Analysis* 15.4 (2007), pp. 428-45. For further research, see Kevin Arceneaux, Thad Kousser, and Megan Mullin, "Get out the vote-by-mail? A randomized field experiment testing the effect of mobilization in traditional and vote-by-mail precincts," *Political Research Quarterly* 65.4 (2012), pp. 882-94, <http://pages.ucsd.edu/~tkousser/PRQ%20Get%20Out%20the%20Vote%20by%20Mail.pdf>.

46. Peter Miller and Sierra Powell, "Overcoming Voting Obstacles: The Use of Convenience Voting by Voters With Disabilities," *American Politics Research* 44.1 (2016), pp. 28-55.

## Voter Engagement by Year

Figure 2 shows how One Arizona's voter engagement efforts have evolved. As the figure shows, coalition groups were most active during the SB 1070 debate. In 2010, One Arizona made 1,159,018 outreach attempts, accounting for 37.8 percent of all attempted voter engagements during the period under evaluation. These outreach attempts resulted in 652,249 successful voter contacts, which accounts for 62.2 percent of all contacts during this period. Moreover, these contacts were made with 232,442 unique voters, accounting for 63.5 percent of all of the unique voters One Arizona engaged during this period.




Figure 2.

## Door-to-Door Canvassing

From 2010 to 2015, One Arizona made 1,095,413 door knocks, leading to 214,698 successful voter engagements with 125,949 unique voters. Table 3 shows the evolution of the coalition's "ground game."

**Table 3. 2010-2015 Door-to-Door Canvassing Results**

Year	Attempts	Contacts	Contacts/ Attempts	Unique Voters Engaged*	Unique Voters Engaged/ Contacts	New Unique Voters Engaged	Approx. Funding Levels for OneAZ
2010	279,283	79,260	28.4%	53,443	67.4%	53,423	\$1M
2011	92,902	21,575	23.2%	14,824	68.7%	8,330	\$375K
2012	175,510	33,314	18.9%	26,570	79.8%	19,137	\$425K
2013	112,088	24,298	21.7%	15,127	62.3%	8,707	\$410K
2014	155,118	16,335	10.5%	14,942	91.5%	9,421	\$550K
2015	280,512	39,916	14.2%	36,920	92.5%	26,931	\$565K
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,095,413</b>	<b>214,698</b>				<b>125,949</b>	<b>\$3,325,000</b>

\*Note: Sum for unique voter contacts by year does not equal total unique voters engaged via door-to-door canvassing because some voters canvassed one year were canvassed in previous years. See "new unique voters engaged" column. The number of new unique voters engaged in 2010 does not equal the number of unique voters engaged because One Arizona's legacy data includes flags from prior to 2010.

### **Door-to-Door Canvassing: Contact Rates**

As Table 3 further shows, in 2010, One Arizona made 279,283 door-to-door canvass attempts that resulted in 79,260 voter contacts with 53,443 unique voters. This represents a contact rate of 28.4 percent.<sup>47</sup> This also represents the high for the period under evaluation. Contact rates for door-to-door canvassing vary widely across field programs and can fluctuate because of many factors, including canvassing in new turf (i.e., working in a neighborhood that an organization has not been in before), the experience of field program managers, the experience of canvassers, the turnover of canvassers, and the days and times that canvassing occurs, among other factors. Contact rates can also vary because of the salience of an election, among other political factors.

### **Door-to-Door Canvassing: Unique Voters Engaged**

Table 3 also shows the percentage of unique voters engaged by One Arizona via door-to-door canvassing. The percentage of unique voters engaged is reflective of the breadth of an organization's ground game: A rising percentage indicates that an organization is having "many conversations with many voters."<sup>48</sup> Indeed, as the table shows, the percentage of unique voters engaged via door-to-door canvassing increased nearly year-to-year during the period under evaluation and reached its highest level in 2015 at a full 92.5 percent.

### **Door-to-Door Canvassing: New Unique Voters Engaged**

Door-to-door canvassing can build relationships with voters whom an organization has not yet engaged; it can also deepen relationships with previously engaged voters. Most field programs are designed with both objectives in mind. One Arizona began building its base in 2010, and as Table 3 further shows, in each subsequent year, the balance of the coalition's ground game has focused on broadening that base.<sup>49</sup> For example, in 2015, 72.9 percent of the unique voters engaged by One Arizona's ground game were voters not canvassed in previous door-to-door field programs. The remaining 27.1 percent of the unique voters engaged served to deepen relationships.



photo: Flickr/Chris McKeever, AFL-CIO

47. Contact rate equals voter contacts divided by outreach attempts.

48. This contrasts with the approach of having multiple conversations with the same voters over the course of an election cycle.

49. That is, the percentage of new unique voters engaged divided by unique voters engaged exceeds 50 percent.

## Live Phone Banking

From 2010 to 2015, One Arizona made 972,134 live phone calls,<sup>50</sup> leading to 84,951 voter engagements with 66,654 unique voters. The bulk of these live phone-banking efforts occurred in the context of SB 1070. In 2010, One Arizona made 352,833 live phone calls, accounting for 36.3 percent of all of the live calls made during the period under evaluation. These calls resulted in 46,087 successful voter engagements, accounting for 54.3 percent of all voter engagements made via live phone banking during this period. Table 4 shows the evolution of One Arizona's live phone banking efforts.

### Live Phone Banking: Contact Rates

As Table 4 shows, the average contact rate for One Arizona's live phone banking efforts is 8.7 percent over the period. The rate reached a peak of 20.6 percent in 2011 but has generally decreased each year since 2010: For example, in 2014, out of 285,183 live phone calls made, 12,113, or 4.2 percent, resulted in a successful voter engagement. Contact rates for One Arizona's live phone banking efforts resemble those of live phone banking efforts elsewhere (and phone-based survey research more generally), as caller ID—and, therefore, screening of unfamiliar numbers—have become ubiquitous, along with cell-phone usage.

### Live Phone Banking: New Unique Voters Engaged

Despite its challenges, live phone banking has strongly complemented One Arizona's ground game. Table 5 shows the number of new unique voters engaged by the coalition's live phone banking efforts, distinguishing between voters who were called only and those who were called and walked via door-to-door canvassing efforts. As the table shows, live phone banking grew One Arizona's base by 42,628 voters during the period under evaluation.

**Table 4. 2010-2015  
Phone Banking Results**

Year	Attempts	Contacts	Contacts/ Attempts
2010	352,833	46,087	13.1%
2011	24,711	5,089	20.6%
2012	186,946	13,895	7.4%
2013	121,484	7,619	6.3%
2014	285,183	12,113	4.2%
2015	977	148	15.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>972,134</b>	<b>84,951</b>	<b>8.7%</b>

**Table 5. Phone Banking:  
Unique Voters Engaged**

Year	Unique Voters Engaged: Called, Not Walked	Unique Voters Engaged: Called and Walked
2010	24,345	15,229
2011	1,350	1,834
2012	8,443	2,175
2013	2,130	2,915
2014	6,323	1,788
2015	37	85
<b>Total</b>	<b>42,628</b>	<b>24,026</b>

50. Live phone calls excludes robocalls.



# **PART THREE:**

## **Looking Forward**

**The state's changing demographics are creating new and unprecedented opportunities to transform antagonistic rhetoric and policies into a more hopeful and democratic future for the majority of Arizona's people.**



## From Anti-Immigrant Extremism to Latino Empowerment

Through the 2000s, as neighboring Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico became more immigrant-friendly, Arizona has stayed mostly and consistently anti-immigrant. Elected officials such as Sheriff Arpaio are often in the media due to anti-immigrant acts and statements and have created an impression at the national level that Arizona is a strongly anti-immigrant state—and likely to remain so. Yet this is only part of the story. Years of anti-immigrant politics have had a paradoxical effect on Latinos, creating uncertainty within families and communities but also politicizing and mobilizing these populations. Moreover, the state's changing demographics are creating new opportunities for Latino voters to change the future of the state's policies. Organizing for a more just and democratic future for Arizona requires an understanding of three factors: demographics, the Latino paradox, and the importance of investing in the state's civic future.

### Demographics: The Changing Arizona Electorate

According to the Pew Research Center, Arizona's Latino population is the nation's sixth-largest, with some 2.1 million Hispanics (3.7 percent of all U.S. Latinos) residing there. Arizona's population is 31 percent Hispanic, the fourth-largest statewide population share.<sup>51</sup> In addition to sheer growth, Arizona's

Latino population is twenty years younger than its non-Hispanic whites.

*Phoenix is now 40 percent Latino. Eight years ago, before I ran for office, there wasn't one Latino on the council; we didn't have a seat at the table. Once I got in, there came two others. The sleeping giant is growing in numbers—and voting numbers.*

—Elected official

However, demography is not destiny. Much of the gap between rates of electoral participation for Latino and non-Hispanic whites has to do with voter turnout. As scholars Louis DeSipio and Rodolfo de la Garza have noted, among all populations, “the young, the less well educated, and the low-income are less likely to vote. All of these groups are disproportionately represented among Latinos.”<sup>52</sup> Getting younger, less affluent, less educated citizens to the polls is always a challenge, and large segments of the Latino community are part of these overlapping populations.

In the 2012 presidential election, for example, there was a twenty-two-point turnout difference, with 62 percent of voting-age whites going to the polls and only 40 percent of eligible Latinos following suit; in other words, nearly 600,000 Latinos who were eligible to vote did not turn out.<sup>53</sup>

51. Gustavo López and Renee Stepler, “Latinos in the 2016 Election: Arizona,” Pew Research Center, January 19, 2016, <http://pewrsr.ch/1JWuFZg>.

52. Louis DeSipio and Rodolfo de la Garza, “Forever Seen as New: Latino Participation in American Elections,” in *Latinos: Remaking America*, edited by Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco and Mariela M. Páez (University of California Press, 2002), pp. 398–409.

53. Sylvia Manzano, “Demographics and Immigration Politics in Arizona,” *Latino Decisions*, March 4, 2014, [www.latinodecisions.com/blog/2014/03/04/demographics-and-immigration-politics-in-arizona/](http://www.latinodecisions.com/blog/2014/03/04/demographics-and-immigration-politics-in-arizona/).

This is a huge untapped segment of the Arizona electorate. But as activists know firsthand, overcoming these impediments to participation requires personal, sustained, and targeted mobilization efforts.

*We're approaching majority-minority status in the state by 2021, with people of color making up more and more legislative districts. The attacks have gone underground, and now we're seeing a lot of voter suppression, with at least ten initiatives on the ballot to suppress the Latino vote. We are in a fight for power: They are doing everything they can to slow our growth.*

*—Elected official*

**In sum, Arizona is well on its way to becoming a majority-minority state. The Latino population is growing rapidly, and this growth represents an unprecedented opportunity to transform the state's political policies and priorities. There is enormous potential for transforming Arizona's electorate. But significant resources are needed if the Latino vote is to achieve its promise.**

## **The Latino Paradox: Mobilizing Anger, Creating Solidarities, and Empowering Communities**

While social-capital and civic engagement scholars often presume that political empowerment requires a community of citizens animated by feelings of optimism, belonging, and civic trust, the reality of how and why people become politicized and engaged is far more complicated. Racially charged legislation such as SB 1070 has made Latinos (regardless of citizenship status) feel under attack. In this way, attacks on the undocumented have also mobilized Latino citizen voters. If SB 1070 has taught Latinos anything, it's that politics matters. Civic engagement isn't just good citizenship—for many in our communities, it's a matter of life and death.

In Arizona, some of the most inspiring examples of how anti-immigrant sentiments and policies can be transformed into solidarity and social justice have come from undocumented youth, as many of them are leading members and active volunteers of the One Arizona table.

*There are many individuals who are Dreamers, in the process of fixing their papers, and they're knocking on doors in 110-degree temperatures, educating people on the right to vote, encouraging them to vote, getting their family members and neighbors to vote: I am here to encourage you as an American citizen to register to vote, to respect the laws of this great country, to know the important civic engagement of voting.*

*—One Arizona community partner*

Dreamers and their allies successfully pressured President Obama into signing a 2012 executive order granting young undocumented immigrants "deferred action." DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) allows immigrants under 30 years old who arrived as

**If SB 1070 has taught Latinos anything, it's that politics matters. Civic engagement isn't just good citizenship—for many in our communities, it's a matter of life and death.**

children to apply for a deportation deferral and stay in the country legally. The implementation of DACA has thus far been a key policy victory and its existence is due primarily to the activism of the undocumented.

*I'm a Dreamer, so doing this work is even more powerful for me. I graduated from high school and never thought I would be looking at a map of my city and strategizing with other organizations about how we would reach my community and raise the bar for voters in Arizona. It's very empowering for me. You don't have to be a mastermind or have degrees to make a change in the community and for our families. I am not able to vote, but I always say that every person who votes is voting for my family and me. They are the voice of my family and me.*

*—One Arizona community partner*

The fight for DACA offers three powerful lessons for the Latino communities in Arizona and elsewhere. One is that when it comes to Latino politics, empowerment is not just about the ballot box. Politics in the Latino community is about more than elections; noncitizens also have a major role to play. Their bravery and

political creativity has inspired native-born and naturalized Latinos, creating an enhanced sense of solidarity and linked fate. In other words, when it comes to the civic life of the Latino community, citizenship is more than a status—it's a practice, something you do in common with others. Undocumented activists in the One Arizona efforts have been some of the most politically active members, practicing a citizenship they do not yet have.

The second lesson is that while there are important demographic distinction between Latinos who hold U.S. citizenship and those who do not, these populations have a great deal of connectivity. In Arizona, 65 percent of Latino voters in the state say they have friends or family members that are undocumented.

*With the announcement of the DACA/DAPA implementation, we have been able to bring together a group of people and have a subgroup, engaging people in the documentation process.*

*—One Arizona community partner*

And third, the aggressive anti-immigrant rhetoric of the current presidential election season is making it more likely that Arizona Latinos may experience a partisan shift in voting similar to what happened in California in the 1990s. In 1994, the California ballot featured Proposition 187, an initiative that called for denying health care and social services to unauthorized immigrants and their children. As with SB 1070, Proposition 187 led to heated demonstrations on both sides; the organizing experience and mobilization surrounding the ballot measure led to increased rates of naturalization and voting among Latinos.<sup>54</sup> Even more significantly, results from studies undertaken during the 1990s show that Latinos who naturalized and registered to vote after 1994 remain more likely to vote than Latinos who registered during less politically charged periods.<sup>55</sup>

54. See Lisa García Bedolla, *Latino Politics*, 2nd edition (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity, 2014), p. 240.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 243.

## **Investing in Democracy: Arizona's Civic Future**

Promoting democratic civic engagement within communities that have experienced widespread discrimination and disenfranchisement is never easy. The challenges are multiple. Newly naturalized Latinos require extra efforts to educate and familiarize them with political institutions different from their countries of origin. And as noted earlier, Latino voters are overrepresented among demographic groups with lower voter turnout—those who are young, poorer, and with less formal education.

Yet real change in voter turnout is possible. In Colorado, President Obama's Latino vote share increased by 14 points between

2008 and 2012. According to U.C. Berkeley political scientist Lisa García Bedolla, electoral success in states like Colorado and California was the result of a sustained investment in building and supporting this emerging Latino electorate: "Organizers on the ground...went into the field early, coordinated and maintained a continual presence on Spanish-language media.... Similar efforts occurred across the country and demonstrate the importance of direct organization and mobilization in order to ensure Latinos are sufficiently represented at the ballot box.... The lesson from November 2012 is that only through sustained organization, mobilization, and coordination can Latinos realize their full electoral potential."<sup>56</sup>

## **Vision Forward: What's Next?**

Stakeholder interviews point to some key considerations in preparing for the next leg of One Arizona's future, and in shaping its impact.

First and foremost are factors that are internal to One Arizona: raising the needed resources to grow its internal capacity, remaining focused on growing the Latino electorate while expanding to include the New American Majority, finding new and creative ways to reach people, devising a system to more intentionally track and measure leadership development, and building partner capacity.

The second set of areas is more external: expansion to other corners of the state,

incorporating students, and securing consistent funding.

### **Pay attention to strengthening One Arizona**

Between 2010 and 2015, One Arizona received approximately \$3,325,000 from private funders and donors to support its field operations as well as core operating funding. This has allowed One Arizona to reach its current level of success. In the long term, it would serve the coalition to think through its financial sustainability model, starting with: Who should fund One Arizona? And what does the ideal funding pie look like—

56. Bedolla, *Latino Politics*, pp. 248-49.

**Between 2010 and 2015, One Arizona received approximately \$3,325,000 from private funders and donors to support its field operations as well as core operating funding.**

for instance, what percentage of funding would organizers like to see from private foundations, local foundations, local donors, labor, grassroots donors and supporters, and public funding sources?

Also, while funders have lifted One Arizona to a high level of effectiveness, there's no question that gaps persist between capacity and need.

*Everyone is stretched really thin. We need resources to build out staff to actually manage the programs. We have to have that to grow. I'm doing three jobs. This is not sustainable.*

—One Arizona founding partner

*Being a national funder, our job is to help find local supporters to sustain these projects, and these organizations are not yet terribly successful at engaging local funders. Immigrant rights may not be the most effective frame to reach the local philanthropic community—perhaps they should frame their efforts as working toward integration and with the DACA program: Once people have legal status, how can we work together to give them education and be self-sufficient?*

—One Arizona funder partner

Apart from attracting external support for individual programs, those programs need staff capacity to execute, making core-operating support the cornerstone of any social sector organization's effectiveness. And it's more challenging to find funding for core operations than for program support—or for midterm election year campaigning.

*We knew that in order for us to build political power, we needed to build the infrastructure and the capacity of people who can do this work. We need to have year-round engagement—the table would not work if it functioned only at election times. Building people power is not episodic, not transactional or opportunistic.*

—One Arizona founding partner

*This is not about an election-year outcome. We need to show the importance of starting early, and not just episodically. We need to be on campus by January of election year, so we can build our relationships and be ready for the fall. We need trained staff who already have relationships.*

—One Arizona schools partner

As One Arizona increases its electoral power and influence, the more organizations and community members expect it to do. It's also an additional challenge for the coalition to not be perceived as going after funding that might otherwise go to one or more of its members.

*I see partners operating with little resources, having to sell their services as a commodity. There's not enough room for them to grow and prosper. My aspiration for them is to have more of a cushion to engage in long-term development around communities and not have to respond to short-term funding imperatives so much.*

—One Arizona consultant and adviser

## Both/and: Continue to expand the Latino electorate while growing to include a New American Majority

One Arizona formed with a core mission to expand the Latino electorate. As the coalition matured, expanding to include new young and women voters made sense, since each block that canvassers cover includes a mix of Latino and new voters. Five years in, One Arizona appears relatively successful in nurturing its roots while adding new voters.

*We have been managing the expansion very carefully so we don't lose our base focus. I don't hear a lot of pushback when we talk about the New American Majority, since we are talking about predominantly Latino groups anyway.*

—One Arizona staffer

*It helps build our credibility to reach more demographic and geographic areas, more areas of the state. It sets us up to move in the future.*

—Focus group participant

This doesn't mean that One Arizona's expansion has lacked tension. In particular, some founding members worry about watering down the coalition's original focus. Others see the expanded parameters as a way to strengthen and evolve the purpose of broadening the electorate.

*My vision for One Arizona's future is getting back to the roots, retaining a focus on Latino community engagement, and fighting anti-immigrant sentiment and laws. In growing we are becoming more inclusive, yet the need remains.*

—One Arizona founding partner

*I think the founding organizations had a purpose of why they came together: to fight back against anti-immigrant sentiment and legislation. We should work with other people, but it doesn't make sense for us to expand the*

*work. I would hate to do what others do to us: parachute in if we are not representative of that community. Things go best when those impacted from that community are doing the work.*

—One Arizona founding partner

In actual implementation, it would bode well for One Arizona to be deliberate about how it deepens existing civic engagement work in Latino and immigrant communities as it expands its reach to engage students, women, and other groups.

*There is some value in staying grounded in the Latino community but also in working with other groups, because that is the electorate that we need to win.*

—One Arizona community partner

Of course, increasing Latinos in the overall electorate and voice is key. But the Latino vote alone can't bring about more inclusive and immigrant-friendly policies. Expanding the coalition's original focus by adding New American Majority voters is ultimately about furthering more pro-immigrant and inclusive policies that benefit all Arizonians.

*In Arizona, you're going to have a hard time actualizing progressive policies if you don't do bridge work and get the support of more moderate voices.*

—One Arizona community partner

*If we're trying to get bigger numbers, why are we skipping unmarried woman at this house and young voters at this house when we can hit all of them on the same block? If we can get more votes on the board and continue to add to the Latino-focused programs, why pass them by? To me, that's dumb.*

—One Arizona founding partner

## Test a proactive policy agenda

When asked about their vision for One Arizona, stakeholders are clear that the table and its partners have become a viable, effective infrastructure for civic engagement; they want to reach a turning point where the efforts of the table gain ground and move forward policies that benefit Latinos, immigrants, and other identity groups.

*In dealing with undocumented issues, it seems like there's a culture shift, particularly in Phoenix, from hostile to willing to at least discuss. But that has not yet translated to new policies.*

—One Arizona founding member

*The state is still introducing anti-immigrant laws, but we have collectively been able to slow these down and mostly block them. The urgency here is to flip the coin and introduce pro-immigrant policies and laws. Obviously we have a lot of work to do—we are still being reactive rather than proactive.*

—One Arizona community partner

Despite the political landscape in Arizona remaining adversarial to Latino and immigrant communities, stakeholders see the logical outcome of One Arizona's growth trajectory to be a shift from a necessary reactive position to a more proactive position. They also understand the need to consolidate their strengths for the battles to come, and to continue to cultivate the foundation for that shift.

*I see the vision getting bigger and bigger every year so that we can change things around 2020. Our operations are getting more youth-driven, getting youth involved sooner rather than later, making new traditions within their own families. 2020 will be huge for us to show the muscle we have as Latinos at the polls. Given the adversity we have faced politically, the whole country will say: If Arizona can do it, then we can too.*

—One Arizona founding member

**“2020 will be huge for us to show the muscle we have as Latinos at the polls. Given the adversity we have faced politically, the whole country will say: If Arizona can do it, then we can too.”**

Granted, developing a proactive policy agenda for a coalition is easier said than done, since inevitably, member organizations don't see eye-to-eye on every priority and issue.

*I want to see One Arizona stay focused and not expand into so many issues. Expanding voter registration is the ticket to change all these other issues we care about.*

—Focus group participant

*We've tried to keep controversial issues away from One Arizona. I've been a strong advocate to stick with voter engagement, focusing on Latino voters because there's not another place for Latino voters that is a home. I advocate for staying in that space. Individual organizations can build on the foundation we've built, and folks can choose whether or not to participate.*

—One Arizona founding member

If One Arizona moves in the direction of setting a policy agenda, it may want to experiment with one or two before moving on to more. As a table, it will need to tread very carefully to preserve what it has built.

**“It’s not just about building an electorate—it’s about building an engaged group of leaders who are taking responsibility for their community. That’s more important than the electoral outcomes, because democracy is about regular, consistent dialogue and engagement and people taking responsibility.”**

### **Regenerate excitement by being more creative in engaging voters**

As One Arizona sits on the verge of expansion, stakeholders want to see the table get creative in reaching and engaging the electorate to evolve its established tactics.

*We talk about how it’s hard to get Latino families out to events. I was at my kid’s ballet folklórico practice, but neither I nor any of the thirty other moms were at our kids’ school board meetings. It’s important to use different ways of engaging people, celebrating people, defining who we are, saying this is the Arizona we want to live in.*

—One Arizona schools partner

*I would like us to do voter festivals, rallies, and marches—visible expressions of power—and also empowering the youth and showing that change is happening.*

—One Arizona founding partner

*Knocking on doors is the least engaging way to take real ownership and responsibility to vote. We need to move to community-driven policy campaigns.*

—One Arizona community partner

### **Strengthen an intentional leadership-development ladder**

Stakeholders maintain that developing young leaders through One Arizona’s infrastructure is one of its biggest accomplishments, and that replicating leadership is both an ingrained cultural practice in the collaborative and the key to its future. Stakeholders want to see this work measured and tracked to more accurately capture and understand success in this area.

*Civic engagement is a great environment for leadership development work, with lots of opportunities for shared leadership. We create opportunities for people to take responsibility and grow as leaders. It’s not just about building an electorate—it’s about building an engaged group of leaders who are taking responsibility for their community. That’s more important than the electoral outcomes, because democracy is about regular, consistent dialogue and engagement and people taking responsibility. That’s what makes democracy dynamic vibrant and powerful, not voting once or twice a year.*

—One Arizona staffer

One Arizona Executive Director Ian Danley suggests the following indicators to measure developing young leaders: “Input: volunteer engagement, and volunteers that convert to leadership or staff. On the front end,

if there are not a significant number of volunteer leaders, then you won't have robust leadership. Output: how much young leaders are taking on responsibility and leadership within the organization. This is an important outcome to measure. Are they taking leadership in the community in broader terms? Are young leaders being prepared and seeing themselves as potential candidates?"

**"More of us need to be in office.... I used to joke that only two types of people run for office, the climbers and too-idealistic types of people. That opinion has changed in the last couple of years."**

Another key measure of leadership development is young leaders within the collaborative expressing interest in running for elected office. This is grounded in the importance of who controls the local political arena and the significance of people from Latino and immigrant communities stepping out front to take responsibility for the community as a whole.

*We need more of our people to run for office. More of us need to be in office. Personally, I have gone from absolutely not to maybe. I used to joke that only two types of people run for office, the climbers and too-idealistic types of people. That opinion has changed in the last couple of years.*

—One Arizona community partner

*If you don't run, someone else is going to, and they may or may not be connected to our values and our movement. "Astroturf" candidates may come in and suck up the resources in the spaces of power that we have created. We need our people to see themselves as candidates. Our movement values are more important than our progressive values, because they are rooted in the relationships of our communities and the humans we are fighting for. It's not abstract.*

—One Arizona staff

### **Expand to other parts of the state methodically**

One Arizona may be a victim of its own success when it comes to expanding its work statewide. There is broad agreement among stakeholders that geographic expansion of One Arizona's reach is the next frontier.

*They have done very successful work in Phoenix. It's easy for me to say to get more involved statewide, beyond pockets in Phoenix, Tucson, and Mesa, but they can change the entire state. If we can get Latinos voting at the rate of the average of the state, we will see much more progressive, pro-human legislators and legislation. That would be a beautiful gift to the state of Arizona. It's tough work, but One Arizona can do it.*

—Elected official

*One Arizona is the coalition to get the state to tip, to convert folks into voters and help mastermind a statewide strategy. With several hundred thousand early voters signed up and motivated, we can shift who's elected to the state legislature. The key is building bridges among communities—Latinos, labor, pro-choice—as one united front.*

—One Arizona founding member

The idea of partnering with existing groups to extend its reach may be a long-term, sustainable strategy.

*I'd love to see a truly statewide infrastructure in at least three other counties, with a table that includes not just Latinos but all kinds of underrepresented communities: black, Native, poor white, people with disabilities, young people.*

—One Arizona community partner

### **Pay attention to building the capacity of partner organizations, especially those more nascent**

Stakeholder interviews point to the uneven capacity and longevity of organizations at the table. Some younger or more specialized organizations have less ability to bring in votes but are nevertheless valuable partners, doing meaningful work.

*The usual thing that happens with coalitions is the table grows but individual organizations' capacity doesn't. There could be more of a focus on building individual organizations to grow, even though it is comfortable to allow the table to do things for you.*

—One Arizona founding partner

Stakeholders highlight the informal learning and mentorship, the sharing of resources that happens among organizations at the table; they stress that the table will be stronger when individual partners are strengthened. The questions, then: What potential does the table structure itself offer for institutionalizing more targeted capacity-building for table partners? How best to groom and develop organizations along with their young leaders? How can the table do an even better job at recognizing and being more intentional about the continuum of organizational capacities present in the collaborative? How can it foster a mutual exchange of information and

expertise between smaller or more specialized organizations and the larger traditional civic engagement powers? The table's health is directly linked to that of its partner organizations.

*Our organization is in transition from being 100 percent volunteer to a combination of staff and volunteers, but my capacity is still limited. As a table, we haven't figured out how to help organizations with weaknesses. New organizations get fewer resources than more established organizations, and I don't understand why this is. We have a more critical need.*

—One Arizona community partner

### **Fortify strategic partnerships to advance civic engagement in schools**

In interviews, stakeholders point proudly to One Arizona's partnership with Arizona Student Vote Coalition. Educators and One Arizona partners alike are hopeful and excited about the potential returns from this partnership, the number of voters who can be activated in schools, and the young people and families who can be reached in this way. Yet there is room for more buy-in, more commitment from the table and from funders to support this partnership in becoming a bridge to One Arizona's future—the new majority. There is work to be done in capturing the lessons learned that are unique to this partnership, to civic engagement in high schools and community colleges. And there are clear ties to the DACA/DAPA work taking place throughout the state.

*When I talk to educators, we see a continuum of civic engagement: Voting is actually an outcome at the end of the continuum—only a small piece. With DACA, we have a real opportunity—tens of thousands of students in public schools today are immediately eligible or will be eligible soon,*

*and we need to take advantage. So we had four forums last year; the smallest was seven people, and the largest was over a hundred families who came to our school.*

*—One Arizona schools partner*

*Showing the table the success of civic engagement among the youth vote in schools has brought more buy-in, and I don't believe that expanding to young people will detract from Latino issues or community. I believe students support Latino issues, LGBTQ issues, and working-family issues.*

*—One Arizona schools partner*

*We are leading all One Arizona members in voter registration right now, with no funding other than my salary. In terms of cost-effectiveness, it's more effective than door-to-door, and people vote at twice the rate. I want to raise up the importance of cross-training, of building sustainability and longevity. One Arizona can be part of that for the student movement, and student work can do that for One Arizona.*

*—One Arizona schools partner*

**“[Money] has given us the ability to dream big. It's like being a parent: Your love is unconditional, then your children grow up to be hopeful and confident. If there isn't that type of support, they have fewer ambitions.”**

## **Importance of continued and consistent funding**

Stakeholders recognize the value of the steady resources funders have provided to build the collaborative. Having early and reliable funding has played a critical role in One Arizona's success. Sustaining those resources and expanding the funder base will be a core need as the coalition undertakes the next leg of its journey. Consistency is key, Ian Danley notes: “It's really challenging to not know what funders' commitments are and to try and build a plan around hypothetical or aspirational budgets, especially when funders make decisions late about where they are going to contribute.”

*Without the money, we wouldn't have the ambitions we have now. It's given us the ability to dream big. It's like being a parent: Your love is unconditional, then your children grow up to be hopeful and confident. If there isn't that type of support, they have fewer ambitions.*

*—One Arizona founding member*

*Funders know that if you create durable capacity, that's where the opportunity for innovation lies, because that allows several organizations to engage in healthy competition, and that's more likely to develop best practices.*

*—One Arizona founding member*

*I'd like for other funders to think about developing organizations at the same time as the coalition, encouraging and funding nontraditional forms of civic engagement and knowing that Arizona is important, that it is the battleground for LGBTQ and other issues. Winning here is winning in the rest of the country.*

*—One Arizona founding member*

## Conclusion

For years, Arizona has been the key battleground in the national fight over immigration—setting the debate and tone for the rest of the country, acting as a home for both the anti-immigration movement and America’s emerging Latino electorate. This constant creep of anti-immigration rhetoric and the ongoing threat of attacks—legal, political, and cultural—have fired up an activism and awareness in response. In 2010, for Latinos, Arizona was a bad place. In a very short time, One Arizona has played a leading role in turning that around.

Owing to One Arizona’s efforts, elected officials and governing bodies are now awake to the significance of the concerns and issues of formerly low-propensity Latino voters. They understand that this is not a population that can be dismissed—on the contrary, it is now a force that must be taken into account in electoral campaigns and races. Elected officials and governing bodies must now be responsive to a broader segment of Arizona’s voting population; this translates into real systemic change and a transformed political landscape.

**Legal permanent residents are more eager than ever to become citizens, citizens anxious to become voters, and voters ready to participate in elections that will reflect their collective political power—not only to their local leaders but to the entire nation.**

*Flipping this state is ripe as anywhere in the country. How quickly we can accelerate that growth is only a matter of time. Once we flip it blue, it will stay blue. We have the strength and organization to lead the nation in progressive politics.*


—One Arizona community partner

The numbers are there. Legal permanent residents are more eager than ever to become citizens, citizens anxious to become voters, and voters ready to participate in elections that will reflect their collective political power—not only to their local leaders but to the entire nation.

Concretely, One Arizona has changed the way Latinos and other low-propensity voters see democracy, their place in the democratic process, their voice, and their power; One Arizona’s efforts have expanded the Latino electorate, brought more New American Majority voters to the polls, and transformed the way previous low-propensity voters to vote.

*Honestly, I believe everything One Arizona is developing is exactly the way we planned it in 2010. We couldn’t have figured out the curves and detours, but we envisioned a table that would exist for a long time, enhance cooperation, increase Latino engagement, and bring in young people. This was our vision back in 2010.*

—One Arizona founding partner

Rather than setting an example for restrictive anti-immigrant policies, Arizona is poised to become a model for Latino civic engagement and political empowerment of the new majority. One Arizona and its stakeholders are modeling to the rest of the country how to fight back with vision, persistence and grit. The country is better because of it. 

# Acknowledgments

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Special thanks go to Ted Wang at Unbound Philanthropy and Anita Khasu and Henry Der for your initiative, guidance, and patience.

Our gratitude goes out to the following people for their willingness to be interviewed and sharing candid feedback with us for this evaluation study:

## Interviewees

1. Abril Gallardo, Arizona Center for Empowerment
2. Alex Gomez, Arizona Center for Empowerment
3. Ben Monteroso, Mi Familia Vota
4. Bill Sheel, Political Consultant
5. Brendan Walsh, Central Arizonans for a Sustainable Economy
6. Carlos Garcia, Puente
7. Casey Dreher, Arizona Student Vote Coalition who also staffs Foundation for Arizona Students
8. Christian Avila, Mi Familia Vota
9. Daniel Valenzuela, Phoenix City Council Member, District 5
10. Dulce Matuz, Arizona DREAM Act Coalition
11. Francisco Heredia, Mi Familia Vota
12. Grecia Lima, Center for Community Change
13. Greg Stanton, Mayor of Phoenix
14. Henry Der, Four Freedoms Fund

15. Jesus de Molina, Protecting Arizona's Family Coalition
16. Joseph Larios, Center for Neighborhood Leadership
17. John Miyasato, Crossroads Campaign Solutions
18. John Lored, Arizona Donor Collaborative
19. Kate Gallego, Phoenix City Council Member, District
20. Karen Narasaki, Consultant to Foundations
21. Lucero Beebe-Giudice, Arizona Education Association
22. Mike Nowakowski, Phoenix City Council Member, District
23. Monica Sandschafer, staff to Congressman Ruben Gallego; previously with ACE
24. Peter Bloch Garcia, formerly with Marguerite Casey Foundation
25. Petra Falcon, Promise Arizona
26. Sarah Michelson, Arizona Wins
27. Ted Wang, U.S. Program Director of Unbound Philanthropy
28. Tomas Robles, Arizona Center for Empowerment

## Focus Group Participants

1. Brendan Walsh, Central Arizonans for a Sustainable Economy
2. Casey Dreher, Foundation for AZ Students
3. Christian Avila, Mi Familia Vota
4. Ian Danley, One Arizona
5. Joseph Larios, Center for Neighborhood Leadership
6. Jesus de Molina, Protecting Arizona's Family Coalition
7. Karina Ruiz, Arizona DREAM Act Coalition
8. Michael Nazario, CHISPA
9. Ricardo Zamudio, Neighborhood Ministries
10. Samantha Pstross, Arizona Advocacy Foundation
11. Tony Navarette, Promise AZ
12. Viva Samuel, Arizona Advocacy Foundation

# APPENDIX 1:

## Complete Voter Engagement, Turnout, and PEVL Data

### 1. One Arizona Voter Engagement

**364,677 unique voters have been engaged by One Arizona.**

From 2010 to 2015, One Arizona made 3,004,804 attempted voter engagements.<sup>1</sup> Door-to-door canvassing, phone banking, and mailers<sup>2</sup> make up 90.8 percent of these outreach attempts. Out of all outreach attempts during the period under evaluation, One Arizona made 1,046,357 successful voter contacts,<sup>3</sup> which translates into a contact rate of 34.9 percent. Because the inclusion of mailers increases contact rates, door-to-door canvassing and phone banking are separately analyzed below. 364,677 unique voters have been engaged by One Arizona. Figure 1 depicts all of One Arizona's outreach attempts during the period under evaluation by mode of contact.




Figure 1.

1. 2,078 voters are marked as canvassed in the data but have no contact type entered.
2. This includes traditional bulk mail, as well as 3,511 postcards mailed in 2011.
3. Contacts refer to voters that have been canvassed by One Arizona. It also includes the "mailed" result code but excludes all other result codes.

## 1.1 Voter Engagement by Year

Figure 2 shows how One Arizona's voter engagement efforts have evolved. As the figure shows, coalition groups were most active during the SB 1070 debate. In 2010, One Arizona made 1,159,018 outreach attempts, accounting for 37.8 percent of all attempted voter engagements during the period under evaluation. These outreach attempts resulted in 652,249 successful voter contacts, which accounts for 62.2 percent of all contacts during this period. Moreover, these contacts were made with 232,442 unique voters, accounting for 63.5 percent of all of the unique voters One Arizona engaged during this period.




Figure 2.

## 1.2 Voter Engagement by Type: Door-to-Door Canvassing

From 2010 to 2015, One Arizona made 1,095,413 door knocks, leading to 214,698 successful voter engagements with 125,949 unique voters. Table 1 shows the evolution of the coalition's "ground game."

**Table 1. 2010-2015 Door-to-Door Canvassing Results**

Year	Attempts	Contacts	Contacts/ Attempts	Unique Voters Engaged*	Unique Voters Engaged/ Contacts	New Unique Voters Engaged	Approx. Funding Levels for OneAZ
2010	279,283	79,260	28.4%	53,443	67.4%	53,423	\$1M
2011	92,902	21,575	23.2%	14,824	68.7%	8,330	\$375K
2012	175,510	33,314	18.9%	26,570	79.8%	19,137	\$425K
2013	112,088	24,298	21.7%	15,127	62.3%	8,707	\$410K
2014	155,118	16,335	10.5%	14,942	91.5%	9,421	\$550K
2015	280,512	39,916	14.2%	36,920	92.5%	26,931	\$565K
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,095,413</b>	<b>214,698</b>				<b>125,949</b>	<b>\$3,325,000</b>

\*Note: sum for unique voter contacts by year does not equal total unique voters engaged via door-to-door canvassing because some voters canvassed one year were canvassed in previous years. See "new unique voters engaged" column. The number of new unique voters engaged in 2010 does not equal the number of unique voters engaged because One Arizona's legacy data includes flags from prior to 2010.

### 1.2.1 Door-to-Door Contact Rates

As Table 1 further shows, in 2010, One Arizona made 279,283 door-to-door canvass attempts that resulted in 79,260 voter contacts with 53,443 unique voters. This represents a contact rate of 28.4 percent.<sup>4</sup> This also represents the high for the period under evaluation. Contact rates for door-to-door canvassing vary widely across field programs and can fluctuate because of many factors, including canvassing in new turf (i.e., working in a neighborhood that an organization has not been in before), the experience of field program managers, the experience of canvassers, the turnover of canvassers, and the days and times that canvassing occurs, among other factors. Contact rates can also vary because of the salience of an election, among other political factors.

### 1.2.2 Unique Voters Engaged via Door-to-Door Canvassing

Table 1 also shows the percentage of unique voters engaged by One Arizona via door-to-door canvassing. The percentage of unique voters engaged is reflective of the breadth of an organization's ground game: A rising percentage indicates that an organization is having "many conversations with many voters."<sup>5</sup> Indeed, as the table shows, the percentage of unique voters engaged via door-to-door canvassing increased nearly year-to-year during the period under evaluation and reached its highest level in 2015 at a full 92.5 percent.

### 1.2.3 New Unique Voters Engaged via Door-to-Door Canvassing

Door-to-door canvassing can build relationships with voters whom an organization has not yet engaged; it can also deepen relationships with previously engaged voters. Most field programs are designed with both objectives in mind. One Arizona began building its base in 2010, and as Table 1 further shows, in each subsequent year, the balance of the coalition's ground game has focused on broadening that base.<sup>6</sup> For example, in 2015, 72.9 percent of the unique voters engaged by One Arizona's ground game were voters not canvassed in previous door-to-door field programs. The remaining 27.1 percent of the unique voters engaged served to deepen relationships.

### 1.3 Voter Engagement by Type: Live Phone Banking

From 2010 to 2015, One Arizona made 972,134 live phone calls,<sup>7</sup> leading to 84,951 voter engagements with 66,654 unique voters. The bulk of these live phone-banking efforts occurred in the context of SB 1070. In 2010, One Arizona made 352,833 live phone calls, accounting for 36.3 percent of all of the live calls made during the period under evaluation. These calls resulted in 46,087 successful voter engagements, accounting for 54.3 percent of all voter engagements made via live phone banking during this period. Table 2 (next page) shows the evolution of One Arizona's live phone banking efforts.

4. Contact rate equals voter contacts divided by outreach attempts.

5. This contrasts with the approach of having multiple conversations with the same voters over the course of an election cycle.

6. That is, the percentage of new unique voters engaged divided by unique voters engaged exceeds 50 percent.

7. Live phone calls excludes robocalls.

### 1.3.1 Live Phone Banking Contact Rates

As Table 2 shows, the average contact rate for One Arizona's live phone banking efforts is 8.7 percent over the period. The rate reached a peak of 20.6 percent in 2011 but has generally decreased each year since 2010: For example, in 2014, out of 285,183 live phone calls made, 12,113, or 4.2 percent, resulted in a successful voter engagement. Contact rates for One Arizona's live phone banking efforts resemble those of live phone banking efforts elsewhere (and phone-based survey research more generally), as caller ID—and, therefore, screening of unfamiliar numbers—have become ubiquitous, along with cell-phone usage.

**Table 2. 2010-2015  
Phone Banking Results**

Year	Attempts	Contacts	Contacts/ Attempts
2010	352,833	46,087	13.1%
2011	24,711	5,089	20.6%
2012	186,946	13,895	7.4%
2013	121,484	7,619	6.3%
2014	285,183	12,113	4.2%
2015	977	148	15.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>972,134</b>	<b>84,951</b>	<b>8.7%</b>

### 1.3.2 New Unique Voters Engaged via Live Phone Banking

Despite its challenges, live phone banking has strongly complemented One Arizona's ground game. Table 3 shows the number of new unique voters engaged by the coalition's live phone banking efforts, distinguishing between voters who were called only and those who were called and walked via door-to-door canvassing efforts. As the table shows, live phone banking grew One Arizona's base by 42,628 voters during the period under evaluation.

**Table 3. Phone Banking:  
Unique Voters Engaged**

Year	Unique Voters Engaged: Called, Not Walked	Unique Voters Engaged: Called and Walked
2010	24,345	15,229
2011	1,350	1,834
2012	8,443	2,175
2013	2,130	2,915
2014	6,323	1,788
2015	37	85
<b>Total</b>	<b>42,628</b>	<b>24,026</b>

## 2. One Arizona Impact

What impact have One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts had? This section analyzes and reports the impact that One Arizona has had on voter turnout focusing on the elections listed in Table 4.

**Table 4. 2010-2015 Voter Engagement and Turnout Results**

<b>Even-Year Federal Elections</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Bias-Adjusted Treatment Effect</b>	<b>Bias-Adjusted Treatment Effect: Latinos</b>
2010	November 2	General	10.1%	19.9%
2012	November 6	General	13.6%	19.6%
2014	November 4	General	6.1%	13.2%
<b>Odd-Year Municipal Elections</b>				
2011	August 30	Phoenix Municipal Primary	0.5% to 0.6%	6.4% to 6.6%
2011	November 8	Phoenix Municipal General	-1.2% to -0.8%	4.9% to 6.3%
2013	August 27	Phoenix Municipal Primary	8.5%	12.1%
2013	November 5	Phoenix Municipal General	Ns	6.5%
2015	August 25	Phoenix Municipal Primary	11.1%	17.1%

Ns = not statistically significant. Note: The treatment effect for even-year elections focuses on low-propensity voters. The range for the 2011 municipal elections reflects the results when including robocalls, and when excluding robocalls. 2011 was the only year in which One Arizona relied heavily on robocalls.

## 2.1 2010 General Election

- One Arizona made over 1 million attempted contacts to just under 300,000 unique voters during the 2010 general election. These efforts were concentrated in Maricopa County, Pima County, and Yuma County.
- Just over three out of every four voters targeted were low-propensity voters.
- One Arizona's attempted contacts were distributed primarily across door-to-door canvassing, live phone banking, and mailers.
- During the 2010 general election, One Arizona's voter engagement efforts increased turnout among low-propensity voters by a robust 10.1 percent ( $p < .000$ ).
- Focusing on Hispanics/Latinos, the data indicate that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts increased turnout among low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters by a robust 19.9 percent ( $p < .000$ ).

During the 2010 general election, One Arizona made 1,159,018 attempted contacts to 298,981 unique voters. 86.8 percent of these unique voters were in Maricopa County, Pima County, and Yuma County.<sup>8</sup> 77.8 percent of the unique voters targeted by One Arizona during the 2010 general election were low-propensity voters and 22.2 percent were high-propensity voters.<sup>2</sup> 83.7 percent were Hispanic/Latino and 12.2 percent were Caucasian. Door-to-door canvassing, live phone banking, and mailers accounted for nearly all of One Arizona's attempted outreach. Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 24.1 percent of attempted contacts, live phone

banking accounted for 30.4 percent of attempted contacts, and mailers accounted for 38.4 percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-door canvassing rate was 38.8 percent. The live phone banking contact rate was 25.1 percent.

*The following thus analyzes the efficacy of One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2010 general election focusing Maricopa County, Pima County, and Yuma County ( $n = 208,929$ ). All voters are analyzed first, and then Hispanics/Latinos are analyzed separately.*

One way to evaluate efficacy is to ask whether the voters One Arizona attempted to contact and successfully engaged were more likely to vote than the voters One Arizona attempted to contact but did not engage. 45.8 percent of the voters One Arizona successfully engaged voted, whereas 35.0 percent of the voters that One Arizona attempted to contact but did not engage voted. This difference in turnout of 10.8 percent is highly statistically significant ( $p < .000$ ). This basic comparison, however, begs important questions. One set of questions relates to the voting behavior of the voters who were and were not part of One Arizona's voter engagement efforts. More specifically, at what rate did voters who were not targeted by One Arizona vote, and how does this compare to the voters One Arizona targeted? Table 5 addresses this question below by disaggregating voters based on vote propensity. Another set of questions relates to whether the voters One Arizona successfully engaged were already more likely to vote than the voters One Arizona did not engage and, if so, how to adjust for this bias when evaluating efficacy. This is addressed in Table 6.

8. Based on 240,856 voters for which data are available. Such slippage is common. More specifically, as the amount of time increases between when a field program happens and when data are requested from a data vendor—be it from VAN (which One Arizona uses) or even a County Registrar of Voters—voter files inevitably change as people move, die, etc.

9. Based on 240,864 voters for which vote history data is available.

Table 5 disaggregates voters by detailed vote propensity. For the 2010 general election, "4 of 4" refers to voters who were eligible to vote in the 2002 general election and voted in each of the 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008 general elections. "3 of 3" refers to voters who registered to vote after the 2002 general election, but before the 2004 general election and voted in each of the 2004, 2006, and 2008 general elections. This pattern repeats down to "0 of 0," which refers to individuals who registered to vote after the 2008 general election but before the 2010 general election (i.e., newly registered voters). These categories are mutually exclusive, meaning a voter can only be in one category, which avoids double counting. Table 5 further distinguishes between three types of voters: voters One Arizona attempted to contact and successfully engaged (column a), voters One Arizona attempted to

contact but did not engage (column b), and voters in Maricopa County, Pima County, and Yuma County who were not part of One Arizona's voter engagement efforts (column c).

As the table shows, the voters One Arizona successfully engaged during the 2010 general election were statistically significantly more likely to vote than the voters One Arizona attempted to contact but did not engage (see column d). This holds true across the entire range of vote propensities. The table also shows that the low-propensity voters One Arizona successfully engaged were significantly more likely to vote than the low-propensity voters in Maricopa County, Pima County, and Yuma County who were outside of One Arizona's target universe (see column e). However, the same is not true at the higher vote propensities.

**Table 5. 2010 General Election: Voter Categories**

	<b>a</b>	<b>b</b>	<b>c</b>	<b>d</b>	<b>e</b>
<b>Vote Propensity</b>	<b>Engaged</b>	<b>Not Engaged</b>	<b>Not Targeted</b>	<b>a minus b</b>	<b>a minus c</b>
4 of 4	90.3%	82.1%	91.2%	8.2%***	-0.9%*
3 of 4	70.4%	61.5%	71.9%	8.9%***	-1.5%***
2 of 4	51.2%	39.2%	47.3%	12.0%***	3.9%***
1 of 4	40.5%	19.9%	28.6%	20.6%***	11.9%***
0 of 4	21.7%	4.9%	10.1%	16.8%	11.6%
3 of 3	76.5%	61.6%	75.8%	14.9%***	Ns
2 of 3	46.1%	37.9%	43.9%	8.2%***	2.2%***
1 of 3	36.5%	15.6%	21.7%	20.9%***	14.8%***
0 of 3	19.5%	5.9%	7.9%	13.6%***	11.6%***
2 of 2	76.4%	64.5%	75.1%	11.9%***	Ns
1 of 2	43.9%	32.2%	40.1%	11.7%***	3.8%***
0 of 2	25.2%	7.8%	9.4%	17.4%***	15.8%***
1 of 1	52.4%	38.1%	47.8%	14.3%***	4.6%***
0 of 1	25.7%	11.2%	12.3%	14.5%***	13.4%***
0 of 0	31.2%	18.5%	36.6%	12.7%***	-5.4%***

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

Table 6 shows the overall efficacy of One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during the 2010 general election distinguishing between low- and high-propensity voters. Turnout among the low-propensity voters One Arizona successfully engaged was 41.4 percent. In contrast, turnout among the low-propensity voters in Maricopa County, Pima County, and Yuma County who One Arizona did not engage was 32.2 percent. This difference of 9.2 percent is highly statistically significant ( $p < .000$ ). This measure is analogous to what is referred to as an “intent-to-treat effect.” More specifically, by focusing only on those voters who One Arizona successfully engaged, this measure of efficacy does not take into account the potential bias that those who One Arizona engaged during a political season were already more likely to vote. It is thus important to ask whether the voters One Arizona successfully engaged are a biased sub-group of voters. Ideally, voter engagement efforts would be designed like randomized control trials (RCTs). Voters<sup>10</sup> would be randomly assigned to control and treatment groups. The control group would receive no attempted intervention by One Arizona (or a placebo message) and the treatment group(s) would represent the voters One Arizona attempted to contact. Random assignment would distribute voters of different demographic characteristics (e.g., age, sex, race and ethnicity, etc.), voting histories, and other important factors, similarly across the groups, which

addresses initial concerns about bias.<sup>11</sup> From here, the question of whether the individuals successfully engaged by One Arizona are a biased sub-group of voters could be accounted for in multiple ways. Taking these steps leads to a final measure of efficacy—a bias-adjusted treatment effect—that accounts for known sources of bias. However, in the absence of an RCT, arriving at a bias-adjusted treatment effect is more difficult.

Table 6 thus reports three different measures of efficacy. The **intent-to-treat effect** compares turnout among voters One Arizona successfully engaged and turnout among voters who were not engaged. This measure does not account for the fact that some of the voters One Arizona attempted to contact were not engaged. It also does not account for the possibility that the voters One Arizona engaged were already more likely to vote. However, it is included because it is perhaps the most intuitive measure of efficacy. The second measure, the **instrumental variable** method, uses contact rates to adjust for bias. We include it here because it is a familiar and commonly used measure in voter engagement RCTs.<sup>12</sup> However, it is not likely to effectively adjust for bias for our purposes here given One Arizona did not determine who to attempt to contact and who not to attempt to contact using a random assignment procedure.<sup>13</sup> The third measure, which is the most desirable, uses a statistical method referred

10. Random assignment can also be performed at the household level, the precinct level, and other units.

11. Balance tests would then confirm that control and treatment group(s) did not substantively differ.

12. For example, see Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment.” *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 03 (2000): 653–63.

13. This is a commonly used measure to evaluate the treatment effect of canvassing in a RCT. More specifically, an instrumental variable regression is used to estimate the effect of voter engagement on turnout. This method adjusts for bias in two steps. The first step is to model the likelihood of successfully engaging a voter using random assignment as an independent variable. The intuition here is that random assignment is related to whether a voter contact is attempted, but is not related to whether a voter votes. The results of the first stage analysis are then used to create a new variable—one that still reflects whether a voter is engaged, but is weighed differently based on contact rates—that is used to estimate a bias-adjusted treatment effect.

to as *inverse probability weighting*. This method is designed for non-randomized observational studies, which is the category of research that the work of One Arizona falls under. This measure reweights the voters One Arizona successfully engaged to reflect the characteristics of the voters One Arizona did not attempt to contact—this ensures that the voters One Arizona successfully engaged are not a “stacked deck.”<sup>14</sup> For example, if 35-year-old Hispanics/Latinos with strong voting histories are significantly more likely to vote than other Hispanics/Latinos, and such voters are overrepresented in the pool of voters successfully engaged by One Arizona, the use of inverse probability weighting weighs these voters down in the analysis. Another strength of this approach is that we can “feed” the model multiple characteristics simultaneously. The analysis below uses attempted contact, age, sex, marital status, and year of registration to adjust for potential bias.<sup>15</sup>

For low-propensity voters in Maricopa County and Pima County, the intent-to-treat effect is 9.2 percent with a low of 8.9 percent and a high of 9.5 percent. The result obtained from the instrumental variable method is a more modest 5.6 percent with a low of 5.3 percent and a high of 5.9 percent. The result obtained from the inverse probability weighting method is a robust 10.1 percent with a low of 9.8 percent and a high of 10.4 percent. That the result obtained from the inverse probability method is stronger than the intent-to-treat effect suggests that

One Arizona effectively engaged difficult to mobilize parts of the electorate. These results are all highly statistically significant ( $p < .000$ ). For high-propensity voters in Maricopa County, Pima County, and Yuma County, the results are consistently negative across estimation methods.<sup>16</sup>

Altogether, these results make clear the strong impact that One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during the 2010 general election had on low-propensity voters. Whereas 31.3 percent of low-propensity voters in Maricopa County, Pima County, and Yuma County voted during the 2010 general election, 41.4 percent of the low-propensity voters that One Arizona successfully engaged voted.<sup>17</sup>

**Table 6. Voter Engagement Efficacy**

Low-Propensity Voters	Treatment Effect	Pvalue	95%CI
Intent-to-treat effect	9.2%	<.000	8.9%, 9.5%
Instrumental variable	5.6%	<.000	5.3%, 5.9%
Inverse probability weighting	10.1%	<.000	9.8%, 10.4%

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

14. This proceeds in two steps. The first stage is to model the likelihood of contact by as many characteristics that we can feed the model. To illustrate, if we suspected that One Arizona was “stacking the deck” by engaging higher-propensity voters, the first-stage model would include vote propensity as a factor.

15. These are the variables that factor into One Arizona’s “Latino plus” targeting. Vote history and race and ethnicity are blocked, and thus also accounted for.

16. For example, the intent-to-treat effect is -14.3 percent ( $p < .000$ ).

17. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa County, Pima County, and Yuma County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2010 general election.

The evaluation of treatment effects provides an additional metric by which to evaluate efficacy: **additional voters added to the electorate**. For example, in an electorate of 10,000 voters, if 5,000 were assigned to a control group, meaning they were not engaged, and 50 percent voted, this means that 2,500 voters would have voted without an intervention. If the remaining 5,000 voters were assigned to a treatment group, meaning they were targeted by One Arizona, and 60 percent voted, this means that 3,000 voters would have voted after being engaged (assuming a perfect contact rate). Altogether, the 10 percent treatment effect in this example translates into 500 additional voters added to the electorate.<sup>18</sup>

***During the 2010 general election, One Arizona added an impressive 12,925 low-propensity voters to the electorate.***

Table 7 repeats the analysis, but focuses on Hispanics/Latinos. For low-propensity Hispanics/Latinos, the intent-to-treat effect is 21.6 percent with a low of 21.2 percent and a high of 21.9 percent. The result obtained from the instrumental variable method is 22.0 percent with a low of 21.6 percent and a high of 22.4 percent. The result obtained from the inverse probability weighting method is 19.9 percent with a low of 19.5 percent and a high of 20.3 percent. These results are all highly statistically significant ( $p < .000$ ). However, similar to the analysis of all high-propensity voters, the results are consistently negative across estimation methods when focusing on high-propensity Hispanics/Latinos.

Altogether, these results suggest that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2010 general election increased turnout among low-propensity Hispanics/Latinos by 19.9 percent. Whereas 21.2 percent of low-propensity Hispanics/Latinos in Maricopa County, Pima County, and Yuma County voted during the 2010 general election, 41.1 percent of the low-propensity Hispanics/Latinos who One Arizona successfully engaged voted.<sup>19</sup>

**Table 7. Voter Engagement Efficacy: Latino Voters**

<b>Low-Propensity Hispanic/Latino Voters</b>	<b>Treatment Effect</b>	<b>Pvalue</b>	<b>95% CI</b>
Intent-to-treat effect	21.6%	<.000	21.2%, 21.9%
Instrumental variable	22.0%	<.000	21.6%, 22.4%
Inverse probability weighting	19.9%	<.000	19.5%, 20.3%

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

18. It is important to note that the potential to add voters to the electorate is greatest at the low-propensity strata. For example, as high-propensity voters, especially during presidential election years, tend to vote at rates near or above 90 percent in many locales, there is a narrower ceiling when it comes to the potential size of treatment effects. Otherwise put, there is more room between 50 percent and 100 percent than there is between 90 percent and 100 percent. Moreover, low-propensity voters tend to outnumber high-propensity voters in many locales across the country.

19. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa County, Pima County, and Yuma County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2010 general election.

## 2.2 2011 Municipal Primary Election in Phoenix

- One Arizona made nearly 200,000 attempted contacts to just under 40,000 unique voters during the 2011 municipal primary election in Phoenix.
- One Arizona's attempted contacts were distributed across door-to-door canvassing, live phone banking, mailers, and robocalls.
- One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2011 municipal primary election in Phoenix increased turnout among all targeted voters by 0.5 percent and 0.6 percent, but the results are inconsistently positive and statistically significant.
- However, when focusing on Hispanic/Latino voters, the data indicate that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts increased turnout among targeted Hispanic/Latino voters by up to 6.6 percent ( $p < .000$ ).

*The following analyzes the efficacy of One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2011 municipal primary election in Phoenix ( $n = 41,969$ ).<sup>20</sup> In Phoenix, One Arizona made 191,038 attempted contacts to 41,969 unique voters. 83.5 percent were Hispanic/Latino.<sup>21</sup> Attempted contacts were spread across door-to-door canvassing, live phone banking, mailers, and other modes of contact (mainly robocalls). Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 20.6 percent of attempted contacts, live phone banking accounted for 10.5 percent of attempted contacts,*

*mailers accounted for 21.9 percent of attempted contacts, and other modes accounted for 46.9 percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate was 44.2 percent. The live phone banking contact rate was 40.6 percent.*

Table 8 shows the efficacy of One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2011 municipal primary election in Phoenix. The first set of results includes all engagements, including robocalls. The intent-to-treat effect is -0.4 percent with a range of 0.0 percent to -0.8 percent. The result obtained from the instrumental variable method is -3.7 percent with range of -3.2 percent to -4.2 percent. The result obtained from the inverse probability method is 0.5 percent with a low of 0.1 percent and a high of 0.9 percent. The table also re-runs the analysis when excluding robocalls. When excluding robocalls, the intent-to-treat effect is statistically insignificant. The result obtained from the instrumental variable method is -1.7 percent with a range of -1.2 percent to -2.1 percent. The result obtained from the inverse probability method is 0.6 percent with a low of 0.1 percent and a high of 0.9 percent.

Altogether, these results suggest that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2011 municipal primary election in Phoenix had a modest effect of between 0.5 percent (when including robocalls) and 0.6 percent (when excluding robocalls). Whereas this analysis includes all voters, the results are drastically different when focusing only on Hispanic/Latino voters.

20. I note here that One Arizona was also active outside of Phoenix during the 2011 municipal primary elections. Outside of Phoenix, One Arizona made 166,082 attempted contacts to 36,318 unique voters. Whereas 33.5 percent were Hispanic/Latino, 61.0 percent are currently coded in the VAN as "unknown." This is based on 25,416 voters for which data are available. Attempted contacts during the 2011 municipal primary elections outside of Phoenix were also spread across door-to-door canvassing, live phone banking, mailers, and other modes of contact (again, mainly robocalls). Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 21.6 percent of attempted contacts, live phone banking accounted for 21.3 percent of attempted contacts, mailers accounted for 18.4 percent of attempted contacts, and other modes accounted for 38.8 percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate outside of Phoenix was 62.8 percent. The live phone banking contact rate outside of Phoenix was 82.9 percent.

21. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 41,969 voters.

**Table 8. 2011 Municipal Primary: Voter Engagement Efficacy**

	<b>Treat- ment Effect</b>	<b>Pvalue</b>	<b>95% CI</b>
<b>All modes of contact</b>			
Intent-to-treat effect	-0.4%	.023	0.0%, -0.8%
Instrumental variable	-3.7%	<.000	-3.2%, -4.2%
Inverse probability weighting	0.5%	<.000	0.1%, 0.9%
<b>Excluding robocalls</b>			
Intent-to-treat effect	-0.3%	.149	-0.7%, 0.1%
Instrumental variable	-1.7%	<.000	-1.2%, -2.1%
Inverse probability weighting	0.6%	<.000	0.1%, -0.9%

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

Table 9 repeats the analysis, but focuses on Hispanic/Latino voters. For Hispanic/Latino voters, the intent-to-treat effect is 5.6 percent with a low of 5.4 percent and a high of 5.7 percent. The result obtained from the instrumental variable method is 6.3 percent with a low of 5.9 percent and a high of 6.7 percent. The result obtained from the inverse probability weighting method is 6.6 percent with a low of 6.2 percent and a high of 7.0 percent. These results are all highly statistically significant ( $p < .000$ ). When excluding robocalls, the intent-to-treat effect for Hispanic/Latino voters is 6.9 percent with a low of 6.7 percent and a high of 7.3 percent. The result obtained from the instrumental variable method is 6.4 percent with a low of 6.1 percent and a high of 6.7 percent. The result obtained from the inverse probability weighting method is 6.4 percent with a low of 6.0 percent and a high of 6.9 percent. These results are all highly statistically significant ( $p < .000$ ).

Altogether, combined with the results above, the data indicate that the impact of One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2011 municipal primary election in Phoenix were concentrated with Hispanic/Latino voters. One Arizona increased turnout among targeted Hispanic/Latino voters by between 6.6 percent (when including robocalls) and 6.4 percent (when excluding robocalls).<sup>22</sup>

22. Whereas it is reasonable to expect the effect to be lower when including robocalls, the results suggest that One Arizona used robocalls to "blanket" difficult to mobilize voters who had not been the targets of previous voter engagement efforts and/or were low-propensity voters. We note here that municipal election vote history was not available for the purposes of the analysis.

**Table 9. 2011 Municipal Primary Voter Engagement Efficacy: Latino Voters**

	<b>Treat- ment Effect</b>	<b>Pvalue</b>	<b>95% CI</b>
<b>Hispanic/ Latino: all modes of contact</b>			
Intent-to-treat effect	5.6%	<.000	5.4%, 5.7%
Instrumental variable	6.3%	<.000	5.9%, 6.7%
Inverse probability weighting	6.6%	<.000	6.2%, 7.0%
<b>Hispanic/ Latino: Excluding robocalls</b>			
Intent-to-treat effect	6.9%	<.000	6.2%, 7.0%
Instrumental variable	-1.7%	<.000	6.1%, 6.7%
Inverse probability weighting	0.6%	<.000	6.0%, 6.9%

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

## 2.3 2011 Municipal General Election in Phoenix

- One Arizona made over 100,000 attempted contacts to just over 30,000 unique voters during the 2011 municipal general election in Phoenix.
- One Arizona's attempted contacts were distributed across door-to-door canvassing, live phone banking, mailers, and robocalls.
- The data indicates that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2011 municipal general election in Phoenix did not increase turnout among targeted voters when all voters are analyzed.
- However, when focusing on Hispanic/Latino voters, the data indicates that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts increased turnout among targeted Hispanic/Latino voters by up to 6.3 percent ( $p < .000$ ).

*The following analyzes the efficacy of One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2011 municipal general election in Phoenix ( $n = 32,144$ ).<sup>23</sup> In Phoenix, One Arizona made 117,873 attempted contacts to 32,144 unique voters. 89.1 percent were Hispanic/Latino.<sup>24</sup> Attempted contacts were spread across door-to-door canvassing, live phone banking, mailers, and other modes of contact (mainly robocalls). Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 19.4 percent of attempted contacts, live*

23. We note here that One Arizona was also active outside of Phoenix during the 2011 municipal general elections. Outside of Phoenix, One Arizona made 69,939 attempted contacts to 36,238 unique voters. 88.3 percent were Hispanic/Latino. This is based on 11,494 voters for which data are available. Attempted contacts during the 2011 municipal general elections outside of Phoenix were spread across door-to-door canvassing, live phone banking, mailers, and other modes of contact (again, mainly robocalls). Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 20.7 percent of attempted contacts, live phone banking accounted for 31.1 percent of attempted contacts, mailers accounted for 19.9 percent of attempted contacts, and other modes accounted for 28.3 percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate outside of Phoenix was 34.5 percent. The live phone banking contact rate outside of Phoenix was 93.7 percent.

24. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 32,144 voters.

phone banking accounted for 5.1 percent of attempted contacts, mailers accounted for 30.8 percent of attempted contacts, and other modes accounted for 44.7 percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate was 33.9 percent. The live phone banking contact rate was 36.9 percent.

Table 10 shows the efficacy of One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during the 2011 municipal general election in Phoenix. The first set of results includes all engagements, including robocalls. As the table shows, the results are consistently negative across each of the estimation methods. This remains true when re-running the analysis when excluding robocalls. These results suggest that One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during the 2011 municipal general election in Phoenix did not increase turnout among targeted voters when all voters are analyzed. However, similar to the pattern for the 2011 municipal primary election in Phoenix, the results are drastically different when focusing only on Hispanic/Latino voters.

**Table 10. 2011 Municipal General Election: Voter Engagement Efficacy**

	<b>Treat- ment Effect</b>	<b>P value</b>	<b>95% CI</b>
<b>All modes of contact</b>			
Intent-to-treat effect	-0.8%	<.000	-0.4%, -1.2%
Instrumental variable	-0.9%	<.000	-0.4%, -1.4%
Inverse probability weighting	-1.2%	<.000	-0.8%, -1.6%
<b>Excluding robocalls</b>			
Intent-to-treat effect	-0.8%	<.000	-0.4%, -1.2%
Instrumental variable	-1.8%	<.000	-1.3%, -2.3%
Inverse probability weighting	-0.8%	<.000	-0.4%, -1.2%

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

Table 11 repeats the analysis but focuses on Hispanic/Latino voters. For Hispanic/Latino voters, the intent-to-treat effect is 6.9 percent with a low of 6.6 percent and a high of 7.3 percent. The result obtained from the instrumental variable method is 7.5 percent with a low of 7.2 percent and a high of 7.9 percent. The result obtained from the inverse probability weighting method is 4.9 percent with a low of 4.5 percent and a high of 5.4 percent. These results are all highly statistically significant ( $p < .000$ ). When excluding robocalls, the intent-to-treat effect for Hispanic/Latino voters is 6.9 percent with a low of 6.2 percent and a high of 7.0 percent. The result obtained from the instrumental variable method is 5.8 percent with a low of 5.4 percent and a high of 6.1 percent. The result obtained from the inverse probability weighting method is 6.3 percent with a low of 5.8 percent and a high of 6.8 percent. These results are all highly statistically significant ( $p < .000$ ).

Altogether, these results suggest that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2011 municipal general election in Phoenix increased turnout among targeted Hispanic/Latino voters by between 4.9 percent (when including robocalls) and 6.3 percent (when excluding robocalls).

**Table 11. 2011 Municipal General Election Voter Engagement Efficacy: Latino Voters**

	<b>Treat- ment Effect</b>	<b>Pvalue</b>	<b>95%CI</b>
<b>Hispanic/ Latino: all modes of contact</b>			
Intent-to-treat effect	6.9%	<.000	6.6%, 7.3%
Instrumental variable	7.5%	<.000	7.2%, 7.9%
Inverse probability weighting	4.9%	<.000	4.5%, 5.4%
<b>Hispanic/ Latino: Excluding robocalls</b>			
Intent-to-treat effect	6.9%	<.000	6.2%, 7.0%
Instrumental variable	5.8%	<.000	5.4%, 6.1%
Inverse probability weighting	6.3%	<.000	5.8%, 6.8%

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

## 2.4 2012 General Election

- One Arizona made over 350,000 attempted contacts to over 200,000 unique voters during the 2012 general election. These efforts were concentrated in Maricopa County and Pima County.
- Just over two-thirds of voters targeted were low-propensity voters.
- Door-to-door canvassing and live phone banking accounted for nearly all of One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2012 general election.
- The data indicate that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts increased turnout among low-propensity voters by 13.6 percent ( $p < .000$ ).
- For low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters, the data indicate that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts increased turnout by a robust 19.6 percent ( $p < .000$ ).

During the 2012 general election, One Arizona made 366,090 attempted contacts to 205,828 unique voters. 88.9 percent of these unique voters were in Maricopa County and Pima County.<sup>25</sup> 67.6 percent of the unique voters targeted by One Arizona during the 2012 general election were low-propensity voters and 22.4 percent were high-propensity voters.<sup>26</sup> 81.5 percent were Hispanic/Latino and 15.3 percent were

Caucasian. Door-to-door canvassing and live phone banking accounted for nearly all of One Arizona's attempted outreach. Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 47.9 percent of attempted contacts and live phone banking accounted for 51.0 percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate was 22.2 percent. The live phone banking contact rate was 8.3 percent.

*The following thus analyzes the efficacy of One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2012 general election focusing Maricopa County and Pima County ( $n = 132,634$ ). All voters are analyzed first, and then Hispanic/Latino voters are analyzed separately.*

Table 12 disaggregates voters by detailed vote propensity.<sup>27</sup> As the table shows, the voters One Arizona successfully engaged during the 2012 general election were statistically significantly more likely to vote than the voters One Arizona attempted to contact but did not engage (see column d). This holds true across the entire range of vote propensities. The table also shows that the low-propensity voters One Arizona successfully engaged were significantly more likely to vote than the low-propensity voters in Maricopa County and Pima County who were outside of One Arizona's target universe (see column e).

25. Based on 322,657 voters for which data are available.

26. Based on 315,625 voters for which data are available.

27. For the 2012 general election, "4 of 4" refers to voters who were eligible to vote in the 2004 general election and voted in each of the 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010 general elections. "3 of 3" refers to voters who registered to vote after the 2004 general election, but before the 2006 general election and voted in each of the 2006, 2008, and 2010 general elections. This pattern repeats down to "0 of 0," which refers to individuals who registered to vote after the 2010 general election, but before the 2012 general election.

**Table 12. 2012 General Election: Voter Categories**

	<b>a</b>	<b>b</b>	<b>c</b>	<b>d</b>	<b>e</b>
<b>Vote Propensity</b>	<b>Engaged</b>	<b>Not Engaged</b>	<b>Not Targeted</b>	<b>a minus b</b>	<b>a minus c</b>
4 of 4	96.7%	94.9%	96.2%	1.8%***	Ns
3 of 4	86.9%	80.1%	82.9%	6.8%***	4.0%***
2 of 4	76.7%	68.6%	66.5%	8.1%***	10.2%***
1 of 4	58.6%	48.7%	45.3%	9.9%***	13.3%***
0 of 4	30.4%	17.2%	17.6%	13.2%***	12.8%***
3 of 3	93.5%	89.6%	93.1%	3.9%*	Ns
2 of 3	84.9%	76.7%	76.4%	8.2%***	8.5%***
1 of 3	71.1%	54.7%	54.4%	16.6%***	16.7%***
0 of 3	34.4%	24.8%	22.2%	9.6%***	12.2%***
2 of 2	90.9%	86.1%	88.2%	4.8%***	2.7%***
1 of 2	70.0%	58.6%	55.9%	11.4%***	14.1%***
0 of 2	40.9%	27.1%	23.5%	13.8%***	17.4%***
1 of 1	84.3%	76.4%	83.5%	7.9%***	Ns
0 of 1	49.8%	34.6%	35.7%	14.5%***	14.1%***
0 of 0	66.5%	51.2%	56.6%	15.2%***	9.9%***

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

Table 13 shows the overall efficacy of One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2012 general election distinguishing between low- and high-propensity voters. For low-propensity voters, the intent-to-treat effect is 14.1 percent with a low of 13.3 percent and a high of 14.8 percent. The result obtained from the instrumental variable method is 10.9 percent with a range of 9.2 percent to 12.6 percent. The result obtained from the inverse probability weighting method, which to recall adjusts for bias using attempted contact, age, sex, marital status, and year of registration, is 13.6 percent with a low of 12.9 percent and a high of 14.3 percent. These results are all highly statistically significant ( $p < .000$ ). For high-propensity voters in Maricopa County and Pima County, the results are consistently negative across estimation methods.

Altogether, these results suggest that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2012 general election increased turnout among low-propensity voters by a robust 13.6 percent. Whereas 48.4 percent of low-propensity voters in Maricopa County and Pima County voted during the 2012 general election, 62.0 percent of the low-propensity voters that One Arizona successfully engaged voted.<sup>28</sup> ***During the 2012 general election, One Arizona added 2,457 low-propensity voters to the electorate.***

Table 14 repeats the analysis, but focuses on Hispanic/Latino voters. For low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters, the intent-to-treat effect is 20.6 percent with a low of 19.8 percent and a high of 21.4 percent. The result obtained from the instrumental variable method is 49.1 percent with a low of 47.4 percent and a high of 50.8 percent.

Recall that the instrumental variable method is most likely an inappropriate measure of efficacy for our purposes here given One Arizona did not use a random assignment procedure to determine which voters to include and exclude from their target universe. The result obtained from the inverse probability weighting method is 19.6 percent with a low of 18.9 percent and a high of 20.4 percent. These results are all highly statistically significant ( $p < .000$ ). Similar to the analysis of all high-propensity voters, the results are consistently negative across estimation methods when focusing on high-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters.

Altogether, these results suggest that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2012 general election increased turnout among low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters by a robust 19.6 percent. Whereas 41.5 percent of low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters in Maricopa County and Pima County voted during the 2012 general election, 61.1 percent of the low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters who One Arizona successfully engaged voted.<sup>29</sup>

28. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa County and Pima County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2014 general election.

29. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa County and Pima County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2014 general election.

**Table 13. Voter Engagement Efficacy**

Low-Propensity Voters	Treatment Effect	Pvalue	95% CI
Intent-to-treat effect	14.1%	<.000	13.3%, 14.8%
Instrumental variable	10.9%	<.000	9.2%, 12.6%
Inverse probability weighting	13.6%	<.000	12.9%, 14.3%

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

**Table 14. Voter Engagement Efficacy: Latino Voters**

Low-Propensity Hispanic/Latino Voters	Treatment Effect	Pvalue	95% CI
Intent-to-treat effect	20.6%	<.000	19.8%, 21.4%
Instrumental variable	49.1%	<.000	47.4%, 50.8%
Inverse probability weighting	19.6%	<.000	18.9%, 20.4%

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

## 2.5 2013 Municipal Primary Election in Phoenix

- One Arizona made nearly 130,000 attempted contacts to over 33,000 unique voters during the 2013 municipal primary election in Phoenix.
- One Arizona's attempted contacts focused on door-to-door canvassing and live phone banking.
- One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2013 municipal primary election in Phoenix increased turnout among all targeted voters by 8.5 percent ( $p < .000$ ).
- Focusing on Hispanics/Latinos, the data indicate that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts increased turnout by 12.1 percent ( $p < .000$ ).

The following analyzes the efficacy of One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2013 municipal primary election in Phoenix ( $n = 33,456$ ).<sup>30</sup> In Phoenix, One Arizona made 129,554 attempted contacts to 33,456 unique voters. 92.4 percent were Hispanic/Latino.<sup>31</sup> Attempted contacts focused on door-to-door canvassing and live phone banking. Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 42.9 percent of attempted contacts and live phone banking accounted for 57.1 percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate was 31.3 percent. The live phone banking contact rate was 19.4 percent.

30. We note here that One Arizona was also active outside of Phoenix during the 2013 municipal primary elections. Outside of Phoenix, One Arizona made 18,311 attempted contacts to 7,266 unique voters. 83.0 percent were Hispanic/Latino. This is based on 3,473 voters for which data are available. Attempted contacts during the 2013 municipal primary elections outside of Phoenix also focused on door-to-door canvassing and live phone banking. Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 36.6 percent of attempted contacts and live phone banking accounted for 63.4 percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-door canvassing rate outside of Phoenix was 15.1 percent. The live phone banking contact rate outside of Phoenix was 13.9 percent.

31. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 33,456 voters.

Table 15 shows the efficacy of One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2013 municipal primary election in Phoenix. The intent-to-treat effect is 10.2 percent with a low of 9.7 percent and a high of 10.7 percent. The result obtained from the instrumental variable method is 10.6 percent with a low of 9.8 percent and a high of 11.5 percent. The result obtained from the inverse probability method is 8.5 percent with a low of 7.9 percent and a high of 9.2 percent.

Altogether, these results suggest that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2013 municipal primary election in Phoenix increased turnout among targeted voters by 8.5 percent.

Table 16 repeats the analysis but focuses on Hispanic/Latino voters. For Hispanic/Latino voters, the intent-to-treat effect is 14.1 percent with a low of 13.8 percent and a high of 14.5 percent. The result obtained from the instrumental variable method is 20.1 percent with a low of 19.5 percent and a high of 20.6 percent. The result obtained from the inverse probability weighting method is 12.1 percent with a low of 11.5 percent and a high of 12.8 percent. These results are all highly statistically significant ( $p < .000$ ).

Altogether, these results suggest that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2013 municipal primary election in Phoenix increased turnout among targeted Hispanic/Latino voters by 12.1 percent.

**Table 15. Voter Engagement Efficacy**

	<b>Treat- ment Effect</b>	<b>Pvalue</b>	<b>95% CI</b>
Intent-to-treat effect	10.2%	<.000	9.2%, 10.7%
Instrumental variable	10.6%	<.000	9.8%, 11.5%
Inverse probability weighting	8.5%	<.000	7.9%, 9.2%

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

**Table 16. Voter Engagement Efficacy: Latino Voters**

<b>Low-Propensity Hispanic/ Latino Voters</b>	<b>Treat- ment Effect</b>	<b>Pvalue</b>	<b>95% CI</b>
Intent-to-treat effect	14.1%	<.000	13.8%, 14.5%
Instrumental variable	20.1%	<.000	19.5%, 20.6%
Inverse probability weighting	12.1%	<.000	11.5%, 12.8%

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

## 2.6 2013 Municipal General Election in Phoenix

- One Arizona made nearly 75,000 attempted contacts to nearly 34,000 unique voters during the 2013 municipal general election in Phoenix.
- One Arizona's attempted contacts focused on door-to-door canvassing and live phone banking.
- The data indicate that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2013 municipal general election in Phoenix did not increase turnout among targeted voters when all voters are analyzed.
- However, when focusing on Hispanic/Latino voters, the data indicate that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts increased turnout among targeted Hispanic/Latino voters by 6.5 percent ( $p < .000$ ).

*The following analyzes the efficacy of One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2013 municipal general election in Phoenix ( $n = 33,864$ ).<sup>32</sup> In Phoenix, One Arizona made 73,369 attempted contacts to 33,864 unique voters. 89.8 percent were Hispanic/Latino.<sup>33</sup> Attempted contacts focused on door-to-door canvassing and live phone banking. Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 58.8 percent of attempted contacts and live phone banking accounted for 41.2 percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate was 37.4 percent. The live phone banking contact rate was 11.7 percent.*

Table 17 shows the efficacy of One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2013 municipal general election in Phoenix. The intent-to-treat effect is positive (0.4 percent) but statistically insignificant. The results obtained from the instrumental variable and inverse probability methods are consistently negative.

These results suggest that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2013 municipal general election in Phoenix did not increase turnout among targeted voters when all voters are analyzed.

**Table 17. Voter Engagement Efficacy**

	<b>Treat- ment Effect</b>	<b>Pvalue</b>	<b>95% CI</b>
Intent-to-treat effect	0.4%	.196	-1.1%, 0.2%
Instrumental variable	-10.9%	<.000	-9.6%, -12.2%
Inverse probability weighting	-0.7%	.024	-0.1%, -1.3%

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

32. We note here that One Arizona also ran a modest program outside of Phoenix during the 2013 municipal general elections. Outside of Phoenix, One Arizona made 12,338 attempted contacts to 6,643 unique voters. 82.1 percent were Hispanic/Latino. This is based on 2,898 voters for which data are available. Attempted contacts during the 2013 municipal general elections outside of Phoenix also focused on door-to-door canvassing and live phone banking. Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 53.1 percent of attempted contacts and live phone banking accounted for 46.9 percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate outside of Phoenix was 24.1 percent. The live phone banking contact rate outside of Phoenix was 8.6 percent.

33. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 33,864 voters.

Table 18 repeats the analysis, but focuses on Hispanic/Latino voters. For Hispanic/Latino voters, the intent-to-treat effect is 7.9 percent with a low of 7.5 percent and a high of 8.4 percent. The result obtained from the instrumental variable method is 14.4 percent with a low of 13.5 percent and a high of 15.3 percent. The result obtained from the inverse probability weighting method is 6.5 percent with a low of 5.9 percent and a high of 7.1 percent. These results are all highly statistically significant ( $p < .000$ ).

Altogether, combined with the results above, the data indicate that the impact of One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during the 2013 municipal primary election in Phoenix were concentrated with Hispanic/Latino voters. One Arizona increased turnout among targeted Hispanic/Latino voters by 6.5 percent.

**Table 18. Voter Engagement Efficacy: Latino Voters**

Low-Propensity Hispanic/Latino Voters	Treatment Effect	Pvalue	95%CI
Intent-to-treat effect	7.9%	<.000	7.5%, 8.4%
Instrumental variable	14.4%	<.000	13.5%, 15.3%
Inverse probability weighting	6.5%	<.000	5.9%, 7.1%

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

### 2.7 2014 General Election

- One Arizona made over a half million attempted contacts to nearly one-quarter of a million unique voters during the 2014 general election. These efforts were concentrated in Maricopa County and Pima County.
- Just over 60 percent of targeted voters were low-propensity voters.
- One Arizona’s attempted contacts were distributed across door-to-door canvassing, live phone banking, and mailers.
- During the 2014 general election, One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts increased turnout among low-propensity voters by 6.1 percent ( $p < .000$ ).
- For low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters, the data indicate that One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts increased turnout by a robust 13.2 percent ( $p < .000$ ).

During the 2014 general election, One Arizona made 551,270 attempted contacts to 231,565 unique voters. 97.8 percent of these unique voters were in Maricopa County and Pima County.<sup>34</sup> 62.1 percent of the unique voters targeted by One Arizona during the 2014 general election were low-propensity voters and 37.9 percent were high-propensity voters. <sup>35</sup> 74.9 percent were Hispanic/Latino and 17.7 percent were Caucasian. Door-to-door canvassing accounted for 28.1 percent of attempted contacts, live phone banking accounted for 51.7 percent of attempted contacts, and mailers accounted for 20.2 percent of attempted contacts. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate was 14.9 percent. The live phone banking contact rate was 8.3 percent.

34. Based on 215,527 voters for which data are available.  
 35. Based on 215,534 voters for which data area available.

*The following thus analyzes the efficacy of One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2014 general election focusing Maricopa County and Pima County (n = 210,755). All voters are analyzed first, and then Hispanic/Latino voters are analyzed separately.*

Table 19 disaggregates voters by detailed vote propensity.<sup>36</sup> As the table shows, the voters One Arizona successfully engaged during the 2014 general election were statistically significantly more likely to vote than the voters One Arizona attempted to contact but did not

engage (see column d). This holds true across nearly the entire range of vote propensities. The table also shows that the low-propensity voters One Arizona successfully engaged were significantly more likely to vote than the low-propensity voters in Maricopa County and Pima County who were outside of One Arizona's target universe (see column e). However, the high-propensity voters One Arizona successfully engaged were significantly less likely to vote than the high-propensity voters in Maricopa County and Pima County who were outside of One Arizona's target universe.

**Table 19. 2012 General Election: Voter Categories**

	<b>a</b>	<b>b</b>	<b>c</b>	<b>d</b>	<b>e</b>
<b>Vote Propensity</b>	<b>Engaged</b>	<b>Not Engaged</b>	<b>Not Targeted</b>	<b>a minus b</b>	<b>a minus c</b>
4 of 4	67.8%	64.4%	81.9%	3.4%***	-14.1%***
3 of 4	40.0%	36.5%	49.7%	3.5%***	-9.7%***
2 of 4	27.7%	17.8%	24.7%	9.9%***	3.0%***
1 of 4	21.0%	10.1%	12.4%	10.9%***	8.6%***
0 of 4	6.3%	1.7%	3.1	4.6%***	3.2%***
3 of 3	42.7%	40.7	61.3	Ns	-18.6%***
2 of 3	26.2%	16.5	23.9%	9.7%***	2.3%***
1 of 3	15.6%	6.9%	8.1%	8.7%***	7.5%***
0 of 3	5.9%	1.5%	2.3%	4.4%***	3.6%***
2 of 2	43.8%	42.6%	60.1%	Ns	-16.3%***
1 of 2	23.5%	15.6%	22.7%	7.9%***	Ns
0 of 2	6.3%	1.9%	2.9%	4.4%***	3.4%***
1 of 1	39.1%	26.2%	41.6%	12.9%***	-2.5%***
0 of 1	7.2%	3.1%	4.1%	4.2%***	3.1%***
0 of 0	24.4%	14.6%	23.2%	9.8%***	1.2%***

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

36. For the 2014 general election, "4 of 4" refers to voters who were eligible to vote in the 2006 general election and voted in each of the 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 general elections. "3 of 3" refers to voters who registered to vote after the 2006 general election, but before the 2008 general election and voted in each of the 2008, 2010, and 2012 general elections. This pattern repeats down to "0 of 0," which refers to individuals who registered to vote after the 2012 general election, but before the 2014 general election.

Table 20 shows the overall efficacy of One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during the 2014 general election distinguishing between low- and high-propensity voters. For low-propensity voters, the intent-to-treat effect is 6.6 percent with a low of 6.3 percent and a high of 6.9 percent. The result obtained from the instrumental variable method is -3.3 percent with a range of -2.9 percent to -3.8 percent. As previously mentioned, the instrumental variable method is most likely an inappropriate measure of efficacy for our purposes here given One Arizona did not use a random assignment procedure to determine which voters to include and exclude from their target universe. The result obtained from the inverse probability weighting method, which to recall adjusts for bias using attempted contact, age, sex, marital status, and year of registration, is 6.1 percent with a low of 5.8 percent and a high of 6.4 percent. These results are all highly statistically significant ( $p < .000$ ). For high-propensity voters in Maricopa County and Pima County, the results are consistently negative across estimation methods.

Altogether, these results suggest that One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during the 2014 general election increased turnout among low-propensity voters by a robust 6.1 percent. Whereas just 16.4 percent of low-propensity voters in Maricopa County and Pima County voted during the 2014 general election, 22.5 percent of the low-propensity voters that One Arizona successfully engaged voted.<sup>37</sup> ***During the 2014 general election, One Arizona added 3,782 low-propensity voters to the electorate.***

**Table 20. Voter Engagement Efficacy**

Low-Propensity Voters	Treatment Effect	P value	95% CI
Intent-to-treat effect	6.6%	<.000	6.3%, 6.9%
Instrumental variable	-3.3%	<.000	-2.9%, -3.8%
Inverse probability weighting	6.1%	<.000	5.8%, 6.4%

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

Table 21 repeats the analysis but focuses on Hispanic/Latino voters. For low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters, the intent-to-treat effect is 13.9 percent with a low of 13.7 percent and a high of 14.3 percent. The result obtained from the instrumental variable method is 12.8 percent with a low of 12.3 percent and a high of 13.2 percent. The result obtained from the inverse probability weighting method is 13.2 percent with a low of 12.8 percent and a high of 13.6 percent. These results are all highly statistically significant ( $p < .000$ ). Similar to the analysis of all high-propensity voters, the results are consistently negative across estimation methods when focusing on high-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters.

Altogether, these results suggest that One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts during the 2014 general election increased turnout

37. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa County and Pima County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2014 general election.

among low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters by a robust 13.2 percent. Whereas just 9.4 percent of low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters in Maricopa County and Pima County voted during the 2014 general election, 22.6 percent of the low-propensity Hispanic/Latino voters that One Arizona successfully engaged voted.<sup>38</sup>

**Table 21. Voter Engagement Efficacy: Latino Voters**

Low-Propensity Hispanic/Latino Voters	Treatment Effect	Pvalue	95%CI
Intent-to-treat effect	13.9%	<.000	13.7%, 14.3%
Instrumental variable	12.8%	<.000	12.3%, 13.2%
Inverse probability weighting	13.2%	<.000	12.8%, 13.6%

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

## 2.8 2015 Municipal Primary Election in Phoenix

- One Arizona made over 100,000 attempted contacts to nearly 70,000 unique voters during the 2015 municipal primary election in Phoenix.
- One Arizona's field program was almost exclusively focused on door-to-door canvassing.
- During the 2015 municipal primary election in Phoenix, One Arizona's voter engagement efforts increased turnout among all targeted voters by 11.1 percent ( $p < .000$ ).
- Focusing on Hispanics/Latinos, the data indicate that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts increased turnout among targeted Hispanic/Latino voters by 17.1 percent ( $p < .000$ ).

*The following analyzes the efficacy of One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2015 municipal primary election in Phoenix ( $n = 67,074$ ).<sup>39</sup> In Phoenix, One Arizona made 112,171 attempted contacts to 67,074 unique voters. 58.5 percent were Hispanic/Latino and 29.8 percent were Caucasian.<sup>40</sup> Door-to-door canvassing comprised nearly all of One Arizona's attempted contacts during the 2015 municipal primary election in Phoenix. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate was 22.3 percent.*

38. Turnout rates may differ slightly from official election results, as vote history is not available for all voters in Maricopa County and Pima County who were registered to vote at the time of the 2014 general election.

39. We note here that One Arizona was also active outside of Phoenix during the 2015 municipal primary elections. Outside of Phoenix, One Arizona made 207,929 attempted contacts to 101,334 unique voters. 17.9 percent were Hispanic/Latino and 75.2 percent were Caucasian. This is based on 75,542 voters for which data are available. Attempted contacts during the 2015 municipal primary elections outside of Phoenix also focused on door-to-door canvassing. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate outside of Phoenix was 33.6 percent.

40. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 67,074 voters.

Table 22 shows the efficacy of One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2015 municipal primary election in Phoenix. The intent-to-treat effect is 12.5 percent with a low of 11.9 percent and a high of 13.2 percent. The result obtained from the instrumental variable method is 7.4 percent with a low of 5.9 percent and a high of 8.7 percent. The result obtained from the inverse probability method is 11.1 percent with a low of 10.4 percent and a high of 11.8 percent.

Altogether, these results suggest that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2015 municipal primary election in Phoenix increased turnout among targeted voters by 11.1 percent.

Table 23 repeats the analysis, but focuses on Hispanic/Latino voters. For Hispanic/Latino voters, the intent-to-treat effect is 18.8 percent with a low of 18.2 percent and a high of 19.4 percent. The result obtained from the instrumental variable method is 29.2 percent with a low of 28.2 percent and a high of 30.2 percent. The result obtained from the inverse probability weighting method is 17.1 percent with a low of 16.2 percent and a high of 17.9 percent. These results are all highly statistically significant ( $p < .000$ ).

Altogether, these results suggest that One Arizona's voter engagement efforts targeted at Hispanic/Latino voters during the 2015 municipal primary election in Phoenix increased turnout by a robust 17.1 percent.

**Table 15. Voter Engagement Efficacy**

	<b>Treat- ment Effect</b>	<b>Pvalue</b>	<b>95%CI</b>
Intent-to-treat effect	12.5%	<.000	11.9%, 13.2%
Instrumental variable	7.4%	<.000	5.9%, 8.7%
Inverse probability weighting	11.1%	<.000	10.4%, 11.8%

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

**Table 16. Voter Engagement Efficacy: Latino Voters**

<b>Low- Propensity Hispanic/ Latino Voters</b>	<b>Treat- ment Effect</b>	<b>Pvalue</b>	<b>95%CI</b>
Intent-to-treat effect	18.8%	<.000	18.2%, 19.4%
Instrumental variable	29.2%	<.000	28.2%, 30.2%
Inverse probability weighting	17.1%	<.000	16.2%, 17.9%

\*\*\* statistically significant at the .001 level, \*\* statistically significant at the .01 level, \* statistically significant at the .05 level. Ns = not significant.

## 2.9 2015 Municipal General Election in Tucson

- One Arizona made nearly 30,000 attempted contacts to nearly 20,000 unique voters during the 2015 municipal general election in Tucson.
- One Arizona's attempted contacts were focused exclusively on door-to-door canvassing.

*The following analyzes the efficacy of One Arizona's voter engagement efforts during the 2015 municipal general election in Tucson (n = 19,380).<sup>41</sup>* In Tucson, One Arizona made 28,444 attempted contacts to 19,380 unique voters. 73.8 percent were Hispanic/Latino and 21.5 percent were Caucasian.<sup>42</sup> Attempted contacts focused exclusively on door-to-door canvassing. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate was 31.4 percent.

41. We note here that One Arizona was also active outside of Tucson during the 2015 municipal general elections. Outside of Tucson, One Arizona made 68,890 attempted contacts to 29,522 unique voters. 16.9 percent were Hispanic/Latino and 75.8 percent were Caucasian. This is based on 9,352 voters for which data are available. Attempted contacts during the 2015 municipal general elections outside of Tucson also focused on door-to-door canvassing. The door-to-door canvassing contact rate outside of Tucson was 71.1 percent.

42. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 19,380 voters. Race and ethnicity data are available for all 67,074 voters.

# APPENDIX 2:

## ONE Arizona Theory of Change

January 2016






Photo: Diego Nacho. Front photo: Camden Strategy/Corrin Foster

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